

SENATE, 47 TO 44, KILLS FUND CURB ON VIETNAM WAR

Rejects an Amendment That Money Could Be Used Only for Withdrawal

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28—The Senate, by a three-vote margin, today rejected a proposed amendment that would have specified that the President could not use funds in Indochina except to withdraw all American forces.

The Senate action represented a major Administration victory in the running battle with the doves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The withdrawal amendment, sponsored by Senators John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, had been included by the Senate Committee in the \$3.2-billion foreign aid authorization bill. Amid threats that President Nixon would veto the bill if the Cooper-Church amendment remained, Administration forces in a series of close votes succeeded in deleting the amendment from the bill.

Scott Motion Wins

The crucial vote on a motion by the Senate Republican leader, Hugh Scott, to delete the Cooper-Church amendment was 47-44.

The Administration, meanwhile, maintained an outwardly neutral stance as Senators James L. Buckley, Conservative-Republican of New York, and Peter H. Dominick, Republican of Colorado, introduced four amendments to limit United States contributions to the United Nations. The amendments were a reaction to the General Assembly's expulsion of Nationalist China Monday.

In the first vote on the United Nations issue, the Senate defeated, 55-28 one of the two Buckley amendments, which would have cut \$102-million from so-called voluntary contributions to the United Nations Development Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization's world food program.

Javits Protests

Senator Buckley said that his amendment was "not intended as a punitive measure" but rather reflected nothing more nor less than a loss of confidence in the United Nations.

Senator Jacob K. Javits protested that approval of the Buckley amendment would be interpreted as an act of "petulance" against the United Nations for expelling Nationalist China and warned, "If we take this road we're doing ourselves a grave disservice."

"We can take on the world if we wish or we can live with the world," Senator Javits said.

Put off until tomorrow were votes on the other Buckley amendment as well as on the two Dominick amendments. The second Buckley amendment, which is believed likely to be approved, calls upon the President to negotiate a reduction in the annual United States assessed contribution from the current level of 31.52 per cent of the United Nations budget to not more than 25 per cent.

The two Dominick amendments were more restrictive. One would require annual Congressional authorization for the mandatory or assessed contributions, which totaled \$111.8-million in 1971, as well as for the so-called voluntary contributions, exceeding \$223.5-million this year, to various specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The second Dominick amendment would specify that the share of the United States voluntary contributions to the specialized agencies could not exceed the United States share of the mandatory payments to the United Nations budget. The effect would be to reduce the United States contributions to the specialized agencies, which now rely upon the United States for about 40 per cent of their budgets.

After a White House conference, Senator Scott told reporters that the Administration was taking "no position" on the Buckley and Dominick amendments.

Another Amendment Deleted

The White House, however, made a major effort to defeat the Cooper-Church amendment on Indochina as well as another Foreign Relations Committee amendment, which would impose a \$250-million ceiling on all military and economic aid to Cambodia in the current fiscal year.

A group of about 20 Republican and Democratic Senators were summoned to the White House for a breakfast briefing by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser.

After the meeting, Senator Scott reported that Mr. Kissinger had indicated that the President would veto the foreign aid bill if the two amendments were not removed. The Administration, the Senator said, would "rather have no bill at all than a bill that removes opportunity for further negotiations in Paris."

The foreign aid bill has already been passed by the House.

Among those attending the White House meeting were Senators Lawton Chiles, Democrat of Florida, and Lloyd M. Bentsen, Democrat of Texas, both of whom had been expected to vote for the Cooper-Church amendment but voted against it. Combined with the absence from the Senate of Senators Fred R. Harris, Democrat of Oklahoma; George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota; and Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, that was enough to assure a rare margin of defeat of Cooper-Church amendment.

The Administration failed, however, by a 52-35 vote, in its attempts to delete an amendment by Senators Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, and Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, imposing a ceiling on military and economic spending in Cambodia. To achieve the victory, however, Senator Symington agreed to raise the ceiling to \$341-million—the amount the Administration plans to spend in Cambodia this fiscal year.

In another victory for the Administration, the Senate, by a 43-40 vote, rejected a committee amendment that would have repealed the 1955 resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces to protect the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands.

Before the United Nations vote expelling Nationalist China, the committee voted to repeal the resolution regarding Taiwan as a step toward curbing the warming powers of the Presidency. The Nixon Administration had taken the position that it was not relying upon the authority of the resolution and had no objection to its repeal.

In the wake of the United Nations vote, however, pro-Administration Senators objected that repeal of the resolution on Taiwan would be untimely and would be interpreted as a sign that the United States would no longer stand by its commitments to the defense of Taiwan.

The defeat of the Cooper-Church amendment today marked the first time in two years that the doves on the Foreign Relations Committee have failed in their moves in the Senate to impose legislative restrictions on the President's authority to undertake military operations in Indochina.

Still remaining in the bill was an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, setting forth the policy that the United States should withdraw all its forces from Indochina in six months, subject only to the release of all American prisoners of war. Rather than fighting the amendment on the Senate floor, the Administration decided to rely upon a Senate-House conference committee to modify the amendment, as was done when a similar Mansfield amendment was attached to the draft extension bill.

Senate Kills Curbs On War Aid, 47-44

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

In a major but bitterly contested victory for President Nixon yesterday, the Senate stripped from the foreign aid bill restrictions on funds for U.S. military operations in Indochina.

By a 47-to-44 vote, the Senate approved an amendment by Minority Leader Hugh Scott (Pa.) killing a provision that would have cut off all funds for further U.S. military operations anywhere in Indochina except for the purpose of withdrawing U.S. troops.

Scott said the provision, sponsored by Sens. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Frank Church (D-Idaho), was absolutely unacceptable to the President and would wreck ne-

gotiations for a peace settlement and preclude any aid to Cambodia and Vietnam even after U.S. troops were withdrawn. "This bill is not going anywhere if this amendment is in it," he said. "It will be vetoed."

In another vote on a proposal which was stimulated by the ouster of the Nationalist Chinese from the United Nations Monday night, the Senate rejected by a 55-to-28 vote an amendment by Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-N.Y.) to slash \$101 million of the \$139 million authorized in the bill for U.N. technical assistance to developing nations.

Scott had told reporters earlier that the administration neither favored nor opposed this and other amendments reducing U.S. contributions to the U.N. Other amendments to cut U.S. funds for the United Nations sponsored by Buckley and Peter Dominick (R-Colo.) were not called up for votes last night by their sponsors.

Approved late yesterday by a 47-to-33 vote was an amendment by Howard W. Cannon

(D-Nev.) requiring the President to suspend foreign aid to any country that expropriates the property of U.S. citizens without compensation. The provision is aimed at Chile. Under existing law—the so-called Hickenlooper provision—the President is given discretion whether to cut off aid to expropriating nations; the Cannon amendment removes

this discretion and requires him to stop aid.

After the Cooper-Church provision was removed, Sen. Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.) offered an amendment to strip out another administration-opposed provision that had been inserted by the Foreign Relations Committee—the Case-Symington provision limiting U.S. economic and military aid to Cambodia to \$250 million, instead of the administration's proposed \$341 million.

The McGee amendment was rejected 52 to 35, but only after Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) promised to offer a later amendment to raise the ceiling in his own proposal to exactly the \$341 million sought by the Nixon administration.

Symington, who said he had the backing of the absent Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), said he would be willing to give the administra-

tion all the funds it wanted for military and economic aid to prop up the Lon Nol government, as long as the principle of Congress setting a ceiling was followed. The administration thus will get the funds it wants—assuming the Symington \$341 million ceiling is approved today—but must come back to Congress for anything more.

The Scott amendment killing Cooper-Church was the crucial vote as far as the administration was concerned.

Scott had been warning his colleagues for two days that Mr. Nixon would veto the whole foreign aid bill—or perhaps seek to defeat it in the Senate and depend on emergency financing for the aid program for the rest of the year—if the Cooper-Church amendment were not removed.

Scott said the Cooper-Church provision would weaken the President's position in peace negotiations, appear to be a "public expression of lack of confidence" in

the way he is handling the ending of the war and a curb on the use of U.S. air power, both to protect U.S. soldiers withdrawing from Vietnam and "to achieve our national objectives in Indochina."

Both Church and Cooper strenuously denied that their proposal, which the Foreign Relations Committee approved, 11 to 5, was a repudiation of the President. Church said the provision was an attempt to assert the power of the purse in foreign policy, an attempt to make it easier politically for the President to get out of Indochina by offering to "share the blame" for withdrawal.

But most of all, both senators said, the Cooper-Church provision—which set no final date for getting out—was designed to assure that the withdrawal by the United States would be absolute, leaving no residual U.S. force or U.S. air, sea or logistical support for further war anywhere in Indochina. The amendment would

also have barred any U.S. air or other support operations once U.S. ground forces are out.

"There are great pressures on the President to leave a residual force of . . . 50,000 men . . . air support, logistical support; if that becomes the policy, we may remain indefinitely," said Church.


Cooper said it was precisely because they did not want to hamstring the President in his program of withdrawing ground troops that his provision had been left with no final withdrawal date. President Nixon has said that the United States would not finally get out of Indochina unless U.S. prisoners are first re-

leased and South Vietnam is in a position to defend itself against the North. The Cooper-Church provision clearly was intended to nullify those two conditions of withdrawal by law.

The administration unleashed a heavy campaign to beat the Cooper-Church provision, including a White House meeting with presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger yesterday by about 20 senators.

Although the vote was 47 to 44, the real margin was actually razor-close — one vote. At the end of the first roll call, the vote was 46 to 45 in favor of killing the Cooper-Church provision. Foreign Relations Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), who had voted against killing it, then switched his vote, making it 47 to 44, order to make himself eligible to force reconsideration of the initial vote.

A move to hewart reconsid-



appears pretty, one which the hearing was held, to reverse the lower court ruling which found no discrimination against Mexican-Americans.

Senate Vote On Change In Aid Bill

Associated Press

Here is the 47-to-44 vote by which the Senate adopted yesterday an amendment by Sen. Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) to strike from the foreign aid bill the Cooper-Church provision cutting off funds for all U.S. operations in Indochina except funds for withdrawal:

Democrats For: 17

Allen (Ala.)	Ervin (N.C.)
Bentsen (Tex.)	Fulbright (Ark.)
Bible (Nev.)	Gambrell (Ga.)
Byrd (Va.)	Hollings (S.C.)
Cannon (Ind.)	Long (La.)
Chiles (Fla.)	McClellan (Ark.)
Eastland (Miss.)	McGee (Wyo.)
Ellender (La.)	Sparkman (Ala.)

Republicans For: 30

Allott (Colo.)	Griffin (Mich.)
Beall (Md.)	Gurney (Fla.)
Bellmon (Okla.)	Hansen (Wyo.)
Bennett (Utah)	Hruska (Neb.)
Boggs (Del.)	Packwood (Ore.)
Brock (Tenn.)	Parson (Kan.)
Buckley (N.Y.)	Roth (Del.)
Cook (Ky.)	Saxbe (Ohio)
Cotton (N.H.)	Scott (Pa.)
Curtis (Neb.)	Smith (Maine)
Dole (Kan.)	Stevens (Alaska)
Dominick (Colo.)	Taft (Ohio)
Fannin (Ariz.)	Thurmond (S.C.)
Fong (Hawaii)	Tower (Tex.)
Goldwater (Ariz.)	Young (N.D.)

Democrats Against: 33

Anderson (N.M.)	Mondale (Minn.)
Beyh (Ind.)	Montoya (N.M.)
Burdick (N.D.)	Moss (Utah)
Church (Idaho)	Muskie (Maine)
Cranston (Calif.)	Nelson (Wis.)
Eagleton (Mo.)	Pastore (R.I.)
Gravel (Alaska)	Pell (R.I.)
Hart (Mich.)	Proxmire (Wis.)
Harkin (Ind.)	Randolph (W. Va.)
Hughes (Iowa)	Ribicoff (Conn.)
Humphrey (Minn.)	Spong (Vt.)
Jordan (N.C.)	Stevenson (Ill.)
Kennedy (Mass.)	Symington (Mo.)
Magnuson (Wash.)	Talmadge (Ga.)
Mansfield (Mont.)	Tunney (Cal.)
McIntyre (N.H.)	Williams (N.J.)
Metcalf (Mont.)	

Republicans Against: 11

Alken (Vt.)	Mathias (Md.)
Brooke (Mass.)	Parcy (Ill.)
Case (N.J.)	Schwartz (Pa.)
Cooper (Ky.)	Stefford (Vt.)
Hatfield (Ore.)	Welcker (Conn.)
Javits (N.Y.)	

Fulbright (D-Ark.) switched his vote in favor of the amendment for the purpose of making a motion to reconsider the vote.

Not voting but announced as paired on the amendment (pairs are used to denote opposing positions of senators when one or both are absent):

Jackson (D-Wash.) for and Herrie (D-Okla.) against.

Not voting nor paired but announced as for the amendment: Jordan, (R-Idaho) and Miller (R-Iowa).

Fulbright Sees Aid Approval

Interim Plan To Curtail Military Items

By John P. MacKenzie
 Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said yesterday that "some form of interim program" for foreign aid may be worked out—minus the Nixon administration's "emphasis upon the military" and other controversial features.

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said his committee will discuss today salvaging many of the "least controversial" aid items in the wake of Friday's stunning 41-to-27 vote to kill the administration's aid program.

The administration meanwhile made plans for a proposed continuing resolution to maintain the current pace of foreign aid funding beyond its Nov. 15 expiration date, giving the White House and Congress time to devise an aid plan for the future.

White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler said President Nixon, assessing the "severe implication" of the Senate vote, conferred with William E. Timmons, his assistant for congressional relations. Timmons in turn spoke with Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.).

Fulbright warned that a flat continuing resolution would face strong attempts to amend it on the Senate floor to eliminate funds for what many senators consider "the use of this program for the military

domination of other countries" while maintaining "real aid" to the economies of underdeveloped lands.

Interviewed on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP), Fulbright said he saw no need for a filibuster to prevent extension of military aid to Greece and countries in Southeast Asia.

He listed among the "least controversial" items aid to Israel and continued help for Palestine and Pakistan refugees.

Fulbright called the Senate vote one of the most encouraging things that has happened in Congress in recent years, in assertion that the "old type" of aid sometimes called welfare imperialism would be scrapped and "a new approach taken."

He said President Nixon's angry reaction to the United Nations vote expelling Taiwan was one of many factors contributing to the foreign aid vote. He charged the administration with "over-lobbying" and "pressure" tactics in both the United Nations and the Senate and said the methods backfired in both places.

See FULBRIGHT, A11, Col. 1

Responding to the charge of "over-lobbying," U.N. Ambassador George Bush said, "That is funny. Some people say (the President) didn't do enough and therefore the foreign aid bill died. You get it coming one way and they slug you another."

Bush, appearing on "Issues and Answers" (ABC, WMAI) said administration officials took a middle course of lobbying vigorously "for the things they believed strongly." He said that although the administration failed "you are going to see a continuation because there are a lot of humanitarian things in there."

Support for several non-military aid items was voiced yesterday by Sens. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) and Charles Percy (R-Ill.). McGovern, a presidential candidate, said he would offer legislation today to restore refugee aid and aid to Israel but bar military help for the "repressive" Greek regime.

FULBRIGHT SEES CONGRESS VOTING INTERIM AID PLAN

But Indicates Opposition to
Administration Package
of Military Assistance

SENATE UNIT SITS TODAY

Chairman Pledges Support
of Relief for Refugees
and Aid to Israel

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 — Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, predicted today that Congress would approve an interim solution to keep foreign aid alive, but he indicated opposition to the formula being devised by the Nixon Administration.

The Arkansas Democrat, one of the leaders in the Senate's defeat of the Administration's foreign aid bill Friday night, pledged his personal backing for what he called "the least controversial" aspects of foreign aid, such as refugee relief and military aid to Israel.

But, affirming his well-known opposition to other American military assistance programs, he said he thought that Administration efforts to retain military aid to Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos—as well as to Greece—would again be defeated by the Senate or would at least produce a long fight.

Expiration on Nov. 15

Administration sources said today that they hoped to push through a resolution to extend economic and military programs for 90 days after the existing continuing resolution

expires on Nov. 15. This would continue aid at the rate of last year's expenditures, or \$2.54 billion a year.

In addition, officials plan to ask for a supplemental appropriation of \$400-million-\$250-million for Pakistani refugee relief and \$150-million for South Vietnamese economic programs.

Approval of that package would carry the aid program into 1972, by which time the Administration would have a new coordinated program to offer Congress, aides said.

Senator Hugh Scott, Republican of Pennsylvania, and Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, have already indicated their desire to carry the Administration's fight for a continuation bill.

Fulbright Indicates Opposition

But Senator Fulbright, reflecting the views of the liberals who opposed the aid bill, largely because of anger over the Administration's role in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam, indicated that he would not support such an administration package. The Senator appeared on the Columbia Broadcasting Company's television program, "Face the Nation."

Senator Fulbright said that when the Foreign Relations

Committee met tomorrow morning, its members would discuss the situation and see what could be done.

"I would say—without having talked to them at all—that some kind of interim program will probably be devised," the committee chairman said. "There are various ways of approaching it. We do not like—I do not like—the continuing resolution approach."

"I am thinking generally along the lines of an interim program which would take care of those parts of the program which are the least controversial," he said.

"There are such things. The children's program is universally applauded, the Palestinian refugees, the Pakistan refugees. No one is opposed to them. A number of things of this character can be put together."

Cites Military Domination

"The really controversial things," he said, "are the use of this program for part of the military domination of other countries."

Critics of the Administration's bill cite the fact that some 55 per cent of the \$3-billion dollar request was for military aid.

Asked if he would support a filibuster on the Senate floor if the Administration introduced a continuing resolution, Mr. Fulbright said that that depended whether the Administration would seek to keep things as they are now, with military aid included. If the Administration did so, he said, he predicted "great opposition."

Israel, he noted, was "a special case," and should be supported.

A Turning Point

In general, Mr. Fulbright expounded his own critical thinking about the way American foreign policy had developed in the postwar years, particularly his view that the defeat of the foreign aid bill was something of a turning point.

He said the vote was "the beginning of a new era—a change in our basic foreign policy."

Foreign aid, he said, started out as a worthy endeavor, but "turned into a tool of the cold war." He said it was a form of "welfare imperialism" by which the United States exerted influence on many countries.

"I think this is the beginning of a re-evaluation of our foreign policy," he said. "This is one aspect of it, an important aspect of it. I think we have followed the idea that we could dominate other countries and make them be subservient to our will."

Senator Fulbright rejected suggestions that the vote was indicative of a new rise in isolationism in the country: "the idea of neo-isolationism is absolutely a misuse of language," he said.

Citing his support for the recent passage in the Senate of a \$2-billion appropriation for international organizations—as distinct from direct aid, which he largely opposes—he said:

"The true internationalist is the one who wants to internationalize these things, who supports things like the United Nations or the International Bank."

Direct aid, he said, is "a vehicle for imperialism, not internationalism."

He said that the military sections of the aid bill were used "for the influencing and perpetuation of existing regimes."

"This has been part of the policy of preservation of the status quo, the prevention of any change in so many countries that need change," Senator Fulbright said. "And this has—this has generally, I think—eroded the basis for the whole program."

Bush Sees Hope for Aid

In another development, George Bush, the United States representative at the United Nations, appearing on the American Broadcasting Company's program "Issues and Answers," said there had been much discontent with the foreign aid program, "but I think in the final analysis, when calm and consideration take over, that there will be a program because people recognize there are some fundamental things being done there that affect the self-interest of everybody in our country."

Mr. Bush said that the Administration would take into consideration some of the complaints made by Senator Fulbright and Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, but that "we are not going to forgo our obligations around the world we are not going to withdraw."

Asked if he felt there was a mood of isolationism in the country, Mr. Bush said: "I think some feel that way and I think the President is determined that that mood not be furthered." Mr. Nixon, he said, "realizes that we cannot withdraw into some Fortress America."

Senator George S. McGovern, the only presidential hopeful on record against the foreign aid bill, was out of Washington Friday when the vote was taken.

But he issued a statement today that he would introduce a bill tomorrow that would restore the \$300-million credit to Israel for purchase of aircraft, continue assistance to Pakistan refugees and bar aid to the Greek regime. He also said his bill would contain funding of the United Nations, at present levels.

NIXON WILL IGNORE CALL BY CONGRESS FOR VIETNAM CUTS

Signs Money Bill Including
Request for Early Pullout
Linked to P.O.W. Action

HE REBUKES THE DOVES

House Then Rejects June 1
Halt in Funds for War but
Trims Pentagon Budget

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17—
President Nixon, in a rebuke
to Congressional doves, an-
nounced today that he would
disregard an amendment set-
ting forth the policy that United
States troops should be with-
drawn promptly from Indo-
china, subject only to the re-
lease of American prisoners of
war.

That restriction was con-
tained in a military procure-
ment authorization bill that the
President signed into law today.

The House of Representa-
tives, responding to a Presi-
dential warning that such legis-
lative restrictions could hinder
the search for a negotiated set-
tlement, handed the Adminis-
tration a victory by refusing to
cut off funds for military op-
erations in Indochina after
June 1.

Two Days of Debate

By a 238-to-164 vote the
House rejected an amendment
to the defense appropriations
bill that would have provided
that none of the funds could
be used to finance military,
combat or support operations
in or over Indochina after June
1 if American prisoners of
war had been released by then.
The amendment was offered by

Republican Edward P. Boland,
Democrat of Massachusetts.

After two days of debate the
House went on to pass the
bill, which provides \$71-billion
in new funds for the Pentagon
—about \$2.5-billion less than
requested by the Administra-
tion.

The vote was the first direct
test of Congressional reaction
to Mr. Nixon's announcement
last week that 45,000 troops
would be withdrawn in the
next two months but that a
residual force would be main-
tained in South Vietnam until
there was a negotiated settle-
ment of the war.

The relatively one-sided vote
indicated that the Administra-
tion was still in control in
Congress on the Vietnam issue,
particularly in the House,
which has been more hawkish
than the Senate.

Since the last test in the
House in October — when a
non-binding amendment on
troop withdrawal was defeated
by a vote 215 to 193 — the
doves have lost strength, large-
ly because of many members,
reluctance to cut off funds for
the war.

The apparent effect of the
President's statement challeng-
ing the withdrawal policy laid

down by Congress was to hard-
en the lines between the execu-
tive branch and the doves and
to encourage a new Senate
move to impose a policy of
complete withdrawal on the
President.

When the defense appropria-
tions bill reaches the Senate, a
move is expected to attach an
amendment specifying that the
President can use the funds
only to withdraw troops from
Vietnam.

Mr. Nixon's statement, issued
by the White House press office
a few hours before the House
vote, was made as he signed
the bill authorizing \$21.4-billion
in weapons production and re-
search by the Pentagon. To it
Congress had attached a modi-
fied version of a troop-with-
drawal amendment sponsored
by Senator Mike Mansfield, the
majority leader.

The amendment, still in the
Senate-passed bill, calls for total
withdrawal in six months, con-
tingent on the release of pris-
oners. As modified in a Senate-
House conference, it declares it
to be "the policy of the United

States to terminate at the ear-
liest practicable date all mili-
tary operations of the United
State in Indochina and to pro-
vide for the prompt and orderly
withdrawal of all United States
military forces at a date cer-
tain, subject to the release of
all American prisoners of war."

Mr. Nixon, in his statement,
did not take direct notice of the
fact that the modified amend-
ment represented a statement
of national policy rather than
just an expression of Congres-
sional opinion. But he made it
clear that he did not feel bound
by it.

"To avoid any miscon-
ceptions," the President em-
phasized that the Mansfield
amendment, in his opinion, "ex-
pressed a judgment about the
manner in which the American
involvement in the war should
be ended" but "does not rep-
resent the policies of this Ad-
ministration."

The amendment, he con-
tinued, "is without binding
force or effect, and it does not
reflect my judgment about the
way in which the war should
be brought to an end." Signing
the bill containing the Mans-
field amendment, therefore, he
said, "will not change the poli-
cies I have pursued and that I
shall continue to pursue toward
this end."

"Our goal—and my hope—is
a negotiated settlement provid-
ing for the total withdrawal of
all foreign forces, including
our own," the President said,
"for the release of all prison-
ers, and for a cease-fire
throughout Indochina."

"In the absence of such a
settlement, or until such a set-
tlement is reached, the rate of
withdrawal of U.S. forces will
be determined by three factors:
by the level of enemy activity,
by the progress of our pro-
gram of Vietnamization and by
progress toward obtaining the
release of all of our prisoners
wherever they are in South-
east Asia, and toward obtain-
ing a cease-fire for all of
Southeast Asia."

'Hinder Rather Than Assist'

Mr. Nixon added that "legis-
lative actions such as this hin-
der rather than assist in the
search for a negotiated settle-
ment."

Basically the same argument
was used by the Administra-
tion's supporters in opposing
the Boland amendment. Repre-
sentative Gerald R. Ford, the
House Republican leader, said
it would stop troop withdraw-
als and jeopardize efforts to
free the prisoners.

On the Democratic side of the
aisle, Representative George H.
Mahon of Texas, chairman of
the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, said the President
should be supported in his with-
drawal policy and warned
that the Boland amendment
would have "disastrous conse-
quences" just at a time when
"we are near the end" of the
Vietnam war.

Arguing that his amendment
would "implement" the policy
contained in the Mansfield
amendment Mr. Boland said a
fund cutoff was necessary be-
cause the President, in his lat-
est troop withdrawal announce-
ment, had "offered no encour-
agement about ending the
United States military role" but
had talked in terms of main-
taining a residual force.

"The way to bring the war
to an end and secure the re-
lease of prisoners of war," Mr.
Boland added, "is to set a date
for American withdrawal."

To applause from the Demo-
cratic side Mr. Boland found
it "incomprehensible and inde-
fensible" for the president to
say he would "ignore a law
passed by Congress."

Senator Frank Church, Demo-
crat of Idaho, who will lead
the move in the Senate to
impose a fund cutoff, protested
in a statement that "the Mans-
field amendment is now part
of the law and, as such, is not
subject to dismissal by the
President."

Noting that Mr. Nixon had
accused that the amendment
was not binding, Mr. Church
asked: "What is he going to
do next? Dispatch Henry Kis-
singer, his foreign policy ad-
viser, to Capitol Hill to disband
the Congress?"

"It is the height of fashion
these days in Southeast Asia
to establish one-man rule, one-
man elections, and disband
people's assemblies. It has hap-
pened in South Vietnam, in
Cambodia and in Thailand to-
day. But ours is a government
of law."

House Rejects End-the-War Move Again

By Richard L. Lyons
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House approved a \$71 billion defense appropriation bill yesterday after decisively defeating another end-the-war amendment.

The bill was passed by a vote of 342 to 51 and sent to the Senate, where the amendment will be offered again. It would have forbidden using any of the \$71 billion for U.S. combat operations in Indochina after next June 1.

Yesterday's effort was the fourth in the House this year to set a deadline for ending U.S. military involvement in Indochina.

In the previous three votes the war opponents' strength had increased from 158 to 176 and then to a high of 193. Yesterday the rising trend was halted. The vote was 238 to 164.

Both Rep. Edward P. Boland (D-Mass.), sponsor of yesterday's amendment, and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Mich.), who opposed it, said this was the toughest antiwar provision ever put before the House. It would have invoked Congress' constitutional control of the purse to cut off

See DEFENSE, A9, Col. 1

DEFENSE, From A1

funds, an act the President could not have ignored. Previous votes were on policy directives which he might have been able to get around.

A spokesman for Common Cause, a citizens' lobby, which fought for the funds cutoff, said that when it came down to this tough decision, a number of House members apparently did not want to take the responsibility of withholding funds.

There was some question whether Boland's amendment would require total withdrawal upon release of all American prisoners. Boland insisted that it did, but opponents insisted that it did not.

Ford also argued, as leaders of both parties in the House have all year, that setting a deadline would tie the hands of the President in trying to negotiate withdrawal of troops by both sides and release of prisoners. Ford said the President would be going to Peking and Moscow with "one trump card less . . . If you want the prisoners back, defeat the Boland amendment," he urged.

Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said the President is ending the war and will have withdrawn 80 per cent of the peak American troop strength by February. Adoption of the Boland amendment would "make it certain that our sacrifice and losses have been in vain," he said.

But Rep. John Flynt (D-Ga.), arguing for the amendment, said the armed forces are being denied needed new equipment because of billions of dollars being "poured down the rathole" in Vietnam.

Rep. Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D-Ind.) offered another amendment that would have ordered all U.S. troops out of Indochina by next Nov. 7, presiden-

tial election day. Jacobs said most people believe President Nixon will end the war before the election. "I offer this just to make sure," he said. Jacobs was beaten, 161 to 52.

Mahon's committee cut the administration's Defense Department spending request by \$2.5 billion, but it is still \$1.5 billion above last year's figure. Inflation was cited as a principal reason. Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said that since the war is ending and the size of the armed forces will be smaller this year than last, the new budget should not be any larger. His attempt to cut back to last year's figure was beaten, 278 to 114.

The bill would provide \$21 billion to pay and support an armed force of 2.5 million; \$20.4 billion for maintenance and operation; \$18.2 billion to buy new major weapons such as planes, ships and missiles; \$7.5 billion for research and development; and \$3.8 billion for pensions.

All efforts to cut the bill or to delete specific items, such as \$800 million to buy the new F-14 Navy fighter plane, were defeated. The closest vote was 211 to 183, defeating a prohibition on any president sending troops into combat for longer than 60 days without approval by Congress.

U.S. Hits Soviet on Arab Jets

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

Secretary of State William P. Rogers has sought personally to warn Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin about the dangers of escalating Soviet airplane deliveries to Egypt.

Rogers, at an unpublicized meeting in his office on Wednesday, informed Dobrynin of the U.S. intelligence finding that up to 10 new TU16 bomber-reconnaissance planes have arrived at airfields south of Alexandria since Nov. 1. They represent the first major aircraft delivery to Egypt from Moscow since July.

Planes Fire Rockets

More important, these planes called "Badger," are equipped for the first time in Egypt to fire air-to-ground "kennel" rockets. The medium-range subsonic plane, akin to the outdated B-47 in the American arsenal, has been used previously in Egypt for reconnaissance over the Mediterranean against the 6th Fleet.

Dobrynin, it is understood, did not offer Rogers any explanation of the new deliveries or why the planes have been given the additional missile capabilities.

American information shows that they are being flown by Soviet pilots, and, like the squadron of Badgers already in Egypt, bear Egyptian markings.

U.S. intelligence is not sure the missiles actually arrived with the planes. But since the launching equipment is on the planes, it is concluded here that these Badgers are to be used as medium bombers against either naval targets or slow-moving parts of the Israeli forces on the Sinai.

The recent deliveries come as an embarrassment to the administration. On Monday, in an interview in U.S. News and World Report, Rogers had noted that U.S. findings up to Nov. 1 were that the Russians had been exercising "some restraint" in shipment of arms to Egypt.

That same day, department spokesman Charles W. Bray III indicated that because the U.S. felt the Middle East situation was still in military balance, Washington was still deferring decision on sending more Phan-

tom F-4 supersonic jet fighters to Israel.

Yesterday, Bray said that since Nov. 1, "we have received indications of some augmentation of Soviet aircraft in Egypt." He added that "we are going to see whether these deliveries may not have opened a gap in what we have described as restraint."

Step Up Pressure

But neither Bray nor any other U.S. official said the new TU16 deliveries upset the military balance. Because the Badger is described as a "jalopy," even equipped with missiles, and because of the small number added so far, officials are skeptical that they will have much new military impact.

The decision by the administration, however, has been to bring maximum pressure on the Russians, through public exposure, to prevent further aircraft deliveries. The U.S. government still is unsure about the Soviet pledge, given to visiting Egyp-

tian President Anwar Sadat Oct. 14, to strengthen Egypt militarily.

Yesterday, the chief State Department aide on the Middle East, Joseph P. Sisco, called in Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to give him the American information about the new planes. After the half-hour meeting Rabin, just returned from a five-day visit to Israel, said he is convinced Soviet deliveries of supersonic jets have continued—in contradiction to the State Department position.

Rabin also said he did not believe the Rogers assessment that the military situation was in balance, even before Nov. 1. He said Israel has learned "not to take so for an answer" in its dealings with the U.S. on aircraft purchases.

The Rogers Dobrynin meeting on Wednesday was their first alone since August. In preparation for the announced Nixon visit to Moscow next May, the two discussed for more than the Middle East—mainly East-West force reductions in Europe.

Delays Annoy U.S.

The administration has been disturbed by Moscow slowness in responding to overtures from NATO on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. Rogers asked Dobrynin why the Soviet government still had not allowed the NATO "explorer"—former NATO secretary general Manlio Brosio—to visit Moscow for initial soundings.

Dobrynin appears to have responded that it is just a matter of time. Yesterday, Bray said that "we are confident that Brosio will be going to Moscow." He also said the United States believes Brosio will be able to give an initial assessment to the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on Dec. 10.

The Rogers Dobrynin meeting is also a backdrop to the strong criticism the secretary of state issued yesterday of Senate appropriation committee moves to cut 60,000 from the 310,000-man American force in Europe. Rogers, speaking through Bray, said unilateral cuts would undermine the President's efforts to get "reciprocal negotiated actions" with the Russians in Europe.

field, outdoor theatre, basketball court, swimming pool, tennis court, parking lot and even benches and a picnic area. They'll make a plaster of paris model and paint it.

All these learning experiences are part of an educational idea dreamed up by James Moffett and he wrote a book about it called, "Student Centered Language Arts Curriculum." In essence, it says, take what children are doing, what they like to do and go from there. The Bartlett School, to go one step further, is planning to launch an open classroom by the end of the year.

CIT HAS PROGRAM

Community Teamwork Inc. already has a skills training program. CIT pays a percentage of the intern's salaries. This is not teaching per se, but "presenting a learning experience," similar to the way pioneer children in the start of this country learned things by watching or helping their parents. But, again, each program, designed by the professional staff, is built around the interests of the children . . . that's the important aspect. The interns see what the children need . . . then the professionals design a program to fit it. Afterwards, said Lynn Packard, the professionals, ". . . guide them (the interns) but we don't tell them."

Mrs. Packard is working with a girl who had trouble understanding logical sequence. She played checkers and chinese checkers with the girl to show her consequences and planning. And the end result, believe it or not is language arts.

Language is nothing if not sequential. To communicate well, one must explain well and logically. All these programs thus relate in the end to a better ability in language, clear thinking and being able to picture things in the mind which is only, after all, imagination. Man thinks and then he makes or says. It's that simple.

At the Green School, it's much the same, but the learning experiences are presented next door at the Smith Baker Center. A girl, blindfolded, is rubbing her index finger over felt letters on a cardboard piece. Before she couldn't read letters. With this method, she can now recognize 35 words. All this in a mere five weeks. She's transforming a sensory touch into a visual image in her mind. Ronald Platt, her intern, is helping.

Intern Gerry Paquin has a genius on his hands, one Danny Gagnon in the fifth grade. Danny didn't like to read last summer. Now he memorizes books verbatim. It was checkers and chess for the first two weeks, then a story board (sounds and pattern kit) in which Danny decided what each character was doing and wrote a sentence about it. Now he takes the characters and makes up stories, poems and even songs, and types them out.

Under a "Little Miss Muffet" character, Danny wrote "a girl saw a bug." Another sentence shows "a boy being burnt by a fire dragon." Danny was writing a song about a king, a ghost and a pleman as he was visited by this reporter and was much too busy to bother explaining it all. His intern is frankly amazed at his scope of learning. It just took that personal interest to bring it out. "He uses me as a kind of dictionary," said Paquin. A picture story by Danny, will be made into a five-act play and slide show.

In another room, a video projector shows stories but draws no conclusions in the narration. Children make up their own endings. At the Smith Baker Center there are a lot of materials and the children are free to pick what they want.

Gagnon's brother, Mark, is only in the second grade, but he has been designing a fancy soapbox derby racer and checks it out after each redesign in the aisles of the center's auditorium. His cart has steering wheels front and back. Note that the interns don't tell the kids how to do something, but offer suggestions as to result. Mark redesigns by seeing a problem, defining the problem, and

figuring a way to beat it. His intern, Mrs. Elmer Hall gives him lots of attention and praise and might help him define the problem after he's discovered it, but he decides how to solve it.

It's the freedom that's important.

Another boy, Joseph Sullivan in the fourth grade is making a lighthouse out of this same mechanical advantage kit.

And on stage, ladies and gentlemen, presenting those great American actors, Bruce Callicutt, Manny Athenais, Eileen Cail and Albert Potter wowing their two intern helpers as they devise a play on the spot. Callicutt is the lunch thief, Athenais catches him, Cail had her lunch stolen and Potter is "Frank", the one who saw the lunch thief break a window. One of the interns plays the principal and the action is hot and heavy. The kids really get fired up and for all intents and purposes the play is real. They make up their lines as they go along.

A teacher in the program noted, "Youngsters get very little air-time, time to express their feelings at home or in large classes. Here they do."

In the old days, children were supposed to be seen and not heard. At Model Cities Education, they're seen, heard, helped and appreciated.

VIETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT

HON. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 12, 1971

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, during the past decade there has been much rhetoric relative to the facts on the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, both the facts and Vietnamese people have been lost in the shuffle from the debate emanating from both sides. What America needs is less hawks and doves and more owls. We need to approach matters wisely, not from emotion ridden ideas.

For far too long we have attempted to view the situation through Western colored glasses. This is very naive and unwise. It is interesting to note that the average Army basic trainee receives no relevant information about the Vietnamese people; their culture, values, or tradition. This is like sending a man unarmed into a political revolution warfare situation. Understanding these aforementioned facts are as important as his rifle and his knowledge of how to use it.

Certainly this is shocking but it has been a prevalent Western attitude too long.

The following information was prepared from the best sources available on the Vietnam history and conflict. I wish to present this material in the hopes that this one candle will help to diminish some of the darkness surrounding the true situation in Vietnam.

The material follows:

VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE 1954-70

THE GENEVA ACCORDS—1954

The Geneva Conference held in 1954 to settle the Indochina War resulted in Accords signed by only two powers: France and North Vietnam. The Accords provided for a military cease-fire, a regroupment of military forces, the provisional division of Vietnam into two zones divided at the 17th parallel, and the free movement of the population between the two zones for a period of 300 days. The Accords also called for the creation of an International Control Commission (Canada,

Poland and India) to supervise the implementation of the provisions.

In declarations attached to the Accords (and unsigned by any powers), it was stipulated that free elections by secret ballot in accordance with democratic procedures should be held in July 1956. The United States and South Vietnam each had urged effective United Nations unification and supervision for these elections. North Vietnam, then and now, totally rejected any U.N. role in Vietnam. The U.S. and South Vietnam therefore refused to sign the 1954 Geneva Accords. No powers signed the final declarations attached to the Accords.

NGO DINH DIEM

In South Vietnam, the political focus rested on Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was appointed Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai in 1954 before the Geneva Accords were drawn up. He was supported by the United States as a result of his long record as a nationalist, non-Communist political leader. Diem was not an American puppet nor was he Cardinal Spellman's silly putty. He had only come to the attention of Americans in 1951 but Diem was the son of the grand chamberlain of the emperor at the Imperial Court in the city of Hue in Central Vietnam. Born into a family which had a long tradition of Catholicism (nearly two million Vietnamese in South Vietnam today are Catholic) Diem was educated at the same high school that Ho Chi Minh had attended in Hue city.

Diem became well-known throughout Central Vietnam as a dedicated, honest and competent nationalist. In 1930, following service as a District Chief, Diem's talents came to the attention of the French administration. The French subsequently offered Diem the position of Minister of Interior. Diem took the post on condition that the French grant genuine concessions toward increased Vietnamese independence. When it became clear that the French had no intentions of keeping their word, Diem resigned after 18 months of service warning the French that they would lose their hold on Vietnam as a result of denying Vietnamese a real role of participation.

In 1940, Diem refused with equal stubbornness to collaborate with the Japanese occupation forces in Vietnam. He remained an obdurate Central Vietnamese patriot. In 1945, Diem's brother was buried alive by Ho Chi Minh's forces in North Vietnam—a fact that Diem never forgot nor forgave. He later offered Diem a position in North Vietnam's short-lived "coalition" government. Diem refused the offer.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT

In 1951, Diem was encountered by American scholars in Tokyo. He was searching for help for Vietnam, just as Ho Chi Minh had left Vietnam in 1912 never to return until 1941. Subsequently, Diem came to the United States. He felt the need of help was more urgent than ever due to the events that had taken place in Southeast Asia. A coalition government formed with nationalists, Communists and neutralists in Hanoi by Ho Chi Minh had been destroyed in six months during the summer and autumn of 1946 and Ho Chi Minh had abolished the Communist party which had only a few months before destroyed the nationalists in the coalition.

By 1951, with Mao Tse-tung in control of the Chinese mainland and involved in the Korean War, Ho Chi Minh had felt bold enough to abolish the broad national front and resurrect the Communist party in public position of leadership. Named the Lao Dong (Workers) Party, in March 1951 this antagonistic non-Vietnamese organism once again was in the saddle. (A theory of a German named Hegel and a vision of a German named Marx was going to be translated into a dictatorship of the proletariat on the unwilling backs of a people who were fighting for genuine Vietnamese independence and

protecting the rights of our citizens and the principles of American justice without which democracy could not survive. All too often, our policemen are criticized unjustly. They are rarely recognized for the services they perform. As we witness the increase in domestic ills—such as drug abuse, violent crime, and civil disobedience—the role of the policeman in our society becomes all the more important. Rural America is not isolated from the domestic problems which plague the large urban areas. All law enforcement agencies share common responsibility regardless of their locale and that is to protect the public domain. They have fulfilled that responsibility in an exemplary manner. During this National Police Week and throughout the year I know that all law-abiding citizens join with me in saluting our law enforcement agencies and in pledging our continued support of them in the same loyal manner as they have served us.

MODEL CITIES—NEW CONCEPT IN EDUCATION

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 11, 1971

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, there is currently underway in Lowell, Mass., a most unique program in education, operated under the auspices of the model cities program and with the leadership of its education director, Patrick J. Mogan.

The individual skills education program, as it is called, seeks in new and highly creative ways to enhance the learning process and to make the learning experience a more successful and certainly a more enjoyable one, for both the disadvantaged child as well as the exceptionally skilled one, and for teacher as well as pupil.

It calls on the abilities of a corps of high-trained professional specialists, and with financial assistance from Community Teamwork, Inc., is able to combine learning with teaching for some 15 interns.

The program is being successfully employed as a supplement to standard teaching practices in several schools and will be expanded in the future. Indeed, I look forward to more of the same results that have been described in the following article from the Lowell Sun. It makes for heartening reading, and I am pleased to include it at this point, for the attention of my colleagues:

[From the Lowell (Mass.) Sun, Apr. 15, 1971]

MODEL CITIES—NEW CONCEPT IN EDUCATION (By Lee Wood)

LOWELL.—The scene is one of utter concentration. As one enters in Bartlett School, three young boys and a young man are huddled on the floor, in the hallway, near a window. On the floor is a map of Lowell. On top of the map is a transistor radio, laying on its back.

What is happening?

Simple. The boys are learning the direction of the radio stations on the map. This leads to explanations by the young man of

the directions streets are laid out and eventually into mapping. The approach is to take what the boys are interested in and go on from there.

And it works. Ten minutes later Wayne Colby has the avid attention of the three boys as he explains the layout of the City of Lowell. Saturday, he and the boys will take a hike, make a tape of the sounds heard in the woods during the hike and take slide pictures. Later they will narrate a slide show and talk of what they saw and heard.

Wayne Colby is an intern. But not in a medical hospital. He's one of 15 interns, all studying to be teachers, that are led by three professional specialists and two staff administrators in a highly effective Individual Skills Education Program through the auspices of the Model Cities Program.

At the Bartlett, just one of seven schools to eventually enter in the program, 44 students were deeply engrossed in writing plays, putting out a newspaper, designing a town, learning word combinations and making colleges among other subjects. Step by step they were allowed to make decisions and work toward a reachable goal . . . all based on their own interests. Students are free to roam around and look at the other projects. But most were so interested in what they were doing that they had to all but be pried loose to talk about it. The groups are gathered in bunches of one to three children per intern.

The results have been good. One boy refused to read in school. Now he can memorize entire short books and narrate the story back verbatim into a recorder days later. He's writing plays and songs.

A girl, who somehow couldn't get the shape of letters clear in her mind, has learned to recognize 35 words on sight in a couple of months.

Four children at the Green School are acting out plays on the spot, improvising their feelings, problems and imagination in such a way that one feels the play is real.

Each group of children is making a book as a history of his project and Polaroid pictures and illustrations are profuse throughout each book.

INTERNS AGED 18-27

The interns range in age from 18 to 27. Most come from the Acre and this is where the program is oriented. Each presently handles 12 children overall, in four programs of one hour each. The idea, mainly, is to use a series of steps in learning for skill development.

The programs are designed by professional teachers who circulate through the rooms the cafeteria at Bartlett) while the interns help the students. The program offers assistance to all sorts of children from those with reading disadvantages to those of exceptional skill.

It is a service to the school . . . giving children individual attention for at least three hours per week, Monday, Wednesday and Friday and is meant as a supplement rather than a replacement for standard teaching practices. One result is to boost language arts. The interns learn just as much from the kids as vice-versa and it helps them to win credits toward their teaching certificates.

Mr. and Mrs. Leonard K. Eisenhood are developing a bi-lingual approach. Both are fluent in Portuguese, Spanish and French besides their native English, and both have been involved in the Migrant Education Program and have college degrees.

The three professional teachers all with Master's degrees, are: Sister Frances Gill with 35 years in the education field and coordinator for the Mor-Harris, with a background in just about everything, including exceptional students (both retarded and highly intelligent), the Bartlett and Green School coordinator and Lynn B. Packard, with teaching credits in Holland, this state and in newspaper work and communications.

PATRICK MOGAN DIRECTOR

Patrick J. Mogan, the director of education at Model Cities is well known in Lowell and was the assistant superintendent of schools in this city for four years. His assistant, Peter S. Stamas, is a Harvard University graduate, attended Massachusetts State College at Boston for his Masters in Education and is going for his doctoral degree at Boston University.

Mogan personally picks the interns whose greatest qualifications seem to be their patience, quiet competence, ability to adapt to the directions in which the children want to go and most of all to their way of relating to the kids as people-to-people rather than teacher-to-student. There is a built in evaluation program as each student is rated on an attitude scale.

Hey wait! What's that kid doing over there? He's destroying a tree. Nope. That boy is breaking branches off a small dead tree on the school stage. And he will take those pieces of stick and will build a log cabin. This will be included as part of a model village (in plaster of paris) to include other houses built with rocks and other materials. It allows the youngsters to learn how a basic material ends up as part of an overall finished product that is still a part of a larger product, the community.

LEARN TO RELATE

The boys and girls, in this program, get to relate to other youngsters and adults in a unique way. It's free expression on their part. Intern Ross Hanvey is helping Michael Laurent in the 6th grade, and 5th graders, Daryl Phillips, Dolores Sylvester and Debra Merley.

The program has shown a gradual growth in the children's work and their books.

Another example: An intern brings in a motorcycle helmet full of collages to show the children just one of the ways art can be done with collages and one end use of same.

But what are those sixth graders doing playing with blocks? Isn't that childish for their age? Not at all. Calvin Burdick and Robert Daigneault are doing free expression with blocks. They make individual buildings with these plastic parts, draw a picture of the building, then make another until they have a picture made of a small city. And when it's finished, it will be their city, that they made themselves. "This gives them a concept of the way a city is structured," said Bud Prevette, the intern. "They're able to see one-way streets and the reasons for them, for instance."

One girl is off by herself typing a story (typewriters are very common in the program), Steven Cochran, fifth grade, is designing a puppet stage for his group's puppet show.

COMPOSE PLAY

Meanwhile, Tina Cox and Paula Camille, both sixth graders, have composed a 17-character play about drugs. "This is to prove that drugs aren't any good," said Tina. The girls are leaving the play ending open so the audience will think about it. Intern Albert Kehoe is helping them. He said it will be a three act play and the girls have even made the characters sign "contracts" so the players, "have to show up."

Intern Mrs. Elmer Hall is assisting Barbara Burdick, Eddy Stavroullas, Christine Minezzi and Cathy Kanellos in making a newspaper to be called, "The Legend." It will be an all-girl newspaper and articles will include items on the four seasons, the different projects at the Bartlett School, poems, the girls' play, plus reviews of other plays, and even a fashion section.

Sixth graders Charles Cooper and Phillip Tingas don't like the North Common area. So, they're redesigning it to be a recreation center. Intern Patricia Brogan said they even want to put a plastic dome over it for all-weather protection. The boys outdid themselves with the design to include: a baseball

the freedom in village self-government terms that has characterized the three regions of Vietnam for centuries.) The Lao Dong Party was in fact but another reincarnation of the first political brainchild of Ho Chi Minh fresh from his 1923-25 training in Moscow—the Indochinese Communist Party of 1930.

DIEM AND THE U.S.

Diem's quest for U.S. support was redoubled after the emergence of the Lao Dong Party from behind the mask of the broad national front against the French in March 1951. Diem was favorably regarded by Senator John F. Kennedy, Senator Mike Mansfield and a host of American political spokesmen who regarded him as a genuine Vietnamese nationalist.

In 1954, the United States decided to support Diem for the post of Prime Minister when he was being considered by Emperor Bao Dai for that job. One reported French reaction to Diem's selection was: "He is the last cigarette in the pack." It was a French estimate that Diem would last only a few weeks. Diem proved to be adept at survival, becoming Prime Minister in 1954 and in 1955 defeating Bao Dai in a national referendum for the position of President. Diem remained President of South Vietnam until November 1963.

REBUILDING IN THE SOUTH

As President of South Vietnam, Diem was able to restore telecommunications, rebuild roads, triple educational enrollment, increase health facilities in the countryside, re-settle nearly a million refugees, meet the challenges of armed political-religious sects threatening the government's authority, destroy the Binh Xuyen, (a Mafia-like organization which controlled the opium, gambling and prostitution in Vietnam which was one of the troublesome legacies from the days of French control) and register a very large increase in rice production. Diem had set South Vietnam on an impressive course of economic reconstruction. Professor Hans Morgenthau lauded Diem and his impressive efforts in 1956 as "a living miracle."

THE DEMISE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS

On the other hand, confronted by the illegal presence of some 5,000 Communist troops in five hold-out areas in South Vietnam, Diem was deeply worried about security in the countryside. He reacted by repressing political opposition. In June 1956, Diem abolished village self-government in South Vietnam. The election of village councils had been a cherished Vietnamese tradition dating back to the 1800's. Diem's action though perhaps understandable in terms of military security opened a deep political vulnerability in the countryside which the Communist cadres skillfully exploited during the following three years. It should be noted that the many local grievance groups that existed in the countryside proved to be fertile targets for the Communist organizers who were determined to prepare the political battlefield in South Vietnam.

DIEM AND THE GENEVA ELECTION ISSUE

Diem had profound concern about any election contest with North Vietnam. He knew the record of North Vietnam's Stalinist regime ruled out the possibility that the North would hold democratic and free elections by secret ballot. The record of Ho Chi Minh's systematic betrayal of Vietnamese nationalists to the French during the previous decades was further cause for caution. Diem also knew that the North (even after the flight of nearly a million refugees to the South) simply outnumbered the South in terms of voting population. Ho Chi Minh had violated the Geneva Accords signed by North Vietnam on the stipulations concerning free choice of movement for the people of the North and the South. Communist roadblocks prevented most of the people of North Vietnam from ever reaching the International

Control Commission teams which were supposed to be available to all. Only those who could reach the ICC teams in the former French-held areas of the Red River Delta had much chance of stating their choice. Others forged papers and tried to slip past the Communist Party security squads which sought to prevent such contact.

U.S. OPINION ON THE 1956 ELECTION ISSUE

Diem was adamant in his reservations. It was certain that the Communist regime would regiment more votes at the ballot box than the South's voting age population could match. The ICC with its pro-Communist Polish representatives could not provide any assurances of a free electoral test. Without U.N. supervision, Diem felt any elections between North and South would be meaningless. American spokesmen such as Senator John F. Kennedy and Senator Mike Mansfield agreed. They continued to press for an election formula calling for effective international supervision and warned against "forcing Diem" into these rigged and unrepresentative elections.

THE POST-GENEVA RECORD

The fact that South Vietnam had never signed the Geneva Accords, added to the strength of Diem's refusal to submit to the Communist demands on this issue. By July 1956, France, one of the two signatories of the Accords, had departed South Vietnam and North Vietnam had consistently violated important provisions of the Geneva agreement by several significant policies. More than 5,000 regular army troops loyal to the Lao Dong Party, the Communist Party of North Vietnam, were left in the South in 1954-55. Their refusal to regroup to the North as the Geneva Accords had prescribed provided North Vietnam with a built-in military threat to South Vietnam's development and survival.

The size of North Vietnam's regular army at home was trebled in open defiance of specific stipulations in the Accords that no increase would take place. In South Vietnam meanwhile, 685 U.S. military advisors were assigned to training tasks in answer to a request by President Diem and in accordance with the Accords provisions permitting rotation of training personnel. At the same time, South Vietnam's regular army was reduced in size to keep within the Geneva stipulations even though neither South Vietnam nor the U.S. were signatories to the Accords.

INSIDE NORTH VIETNAM 1954-1956

Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam by 1956, was experiencing widespread unrest and resistance to the bloody "land readjustment" campaign which killed small farmers and landholders as a preparatory step to turn their lands into collective farms. There were a minimum of large landlords in North Vietnam which had traditionally been a country of small farms and land worked by the owners. Nevertheless, more than 50,000 people were executed by the Communist Party campaign in two years. By 1956 more than a half a million people were in forced labor camps or re-education centers and countless families had been destroyed by wives being forced to divorce their husbands who had been branded "reactionaries." In August 1956, intellectuals in Hanoi publicly demanded the overthrow of the Lao Dong Party publishing their demand in the newspaper "Nhan Van" (Humanity). The Lao Dong Party closed the protesting newspapers and periodicals, suppressed the university students and jailed the dissenters.

REBELLION IN NORTH VIETNAM—1956

In November 1956, despite regime apologies for the "tortures and murders" of the previous two years, the farmers of Ho Chi Minh's home province of Nghe An, rose against their Stalinist masters, seized guns from the Communist Party army and

fought against the Lao Dong Party. Two divisions of North Vietnamese regular army troops were sent in to suppress this rebellion, but the troops could not erase the fact that the people of North Vietnam were emulating the revolts flaring in Poland and Hungary a half a world away against the same system of totalitarian Communist rule.

This was the atmosphere in 1956 when the North Vietnamese might otherwise have held the Geneva-prescribed elections. The precincts in North Vietnam were rotten. There were no model unification elections there either. Ho wept on national radio in North Vietnam and apologized for errors and mistakes of the land reform executions: "My children, Land Reform is like hot soup. It must be taken slowly." General Giap, hero of Dienbienphu and Defense Minister of North Vietnam apologized before a formal meeting of the Party Congress, stressing that the murders and tortures that had occurred during those two years were a result of over zealous actions.

HO CHI MINH

When Ho took power as a Communist leader in North Vietnam in 1954, he had already traveled a long and special road. He had been born in 1890 with the name: Nguyen That Thanh. (Nguyen Who Will Be Victorious). In his lifetime he would adopt and discard 21 aliases to mask his identity. His father was a functionaire and was alternately working for and being persecuted by the French. In 1912 Ho left Vietnam under an alias as a cabin boy on a French ship and in time sailed from Marseilles, France on the maritime routes that took him to Africa, New York City and London. In the years of World War I he was in France where he was known as Nguyen O Phap (Nguyen Who Hates the French). In 1919 he wrote a top hat and tails and attempted to present a petition for Vietnam's independence to the Big Four peace conference meeting at Versailles. They were too busy to see him.

ALIAS NGUYEN AI QUOC

In 1920, re-inforcing his years of contact with the Socialist movement in Europe, he attended the socialist Congress at Tours, France and when the meeting split into two factions, he followed the Communist faction into session and became a founding member of the French Communist Party. He adopted the name: Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot). His French Communist Party roots would show clearly years later when he, in 1946, negotiated the return of the French to Vietnam (the French Communist Party felt it had a good chance of conquering France by parliamentary action in 1946 and issued orders that year to the Vietnamese Communist Party that "under no circumstances should any attempt be made to prevent the return of French troops to Vietnam in 1946"). Ho Chi Minh bargained the French in to get the occupying Chinese Nationalist troops and influence out of North Vietnam. Southern Communist protested the entire arrangement charging Ho with being a nation seller and a betrayer. This was not a new allegation on Ho's record.

After the 1920 founding of the French Communist Party, Nguyen Ai Quoc was sent to Moscow to the Lenin Institute for training at the Toller of the East School. There from 1923-1925 he refined his skills as a Communist organizer.

In 1925, he was assigned to Canton, China as a member of the Russian Consulate headed by Borodin. Nguyen Ai Quoc was listed as a clerk and an interpreter, but his real job was to organize Communist activities in Southeast Asia. One of Nguyen Ai Quoc's first acts upon arrival in Canton was to invite to Shanghai the leading Vietnamese fighter against the French, Phan Boi Chau. Chau had been leading the struggle against the French for more than 25 years inside Vietnam. Nguyen Ai Quoc's organization sold

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Phan Boi Chau to the French security police in Shanghai, China in 1925. A trip to talk about revolution had ended in betrayal and nationalist struggle against the French was weakened by the actions of the Communist organizer, Nguyen Ai Quoc. Two hundred other nationalists of various parties were subsequently invited to China by Nguyen Ai Quoc to study revolution. After a year's study at Whampoa Military Academy many of them refused to join the Communist movement and they too were betrayed to the French Surete as they attempted to clandestinely return to Vietnam. Nationalists who had thus encountered Nguyen Ai Quoc's organization had the contemporary opinion that Nguyen Ai Quoc was betraying Vietnamese nationalism not fostering it. Nguyen Ai Quoc had to flee for safety to northeast Thailand when the coalition arrangement between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists broke down in 1928.

THE "DEATH" OF NGUYEN AI QUOC

In 1930 Nguyen Ai Quoc held a Congress of the quarreling factions of the Indochina Communist groups in Hong Kong. There he founded the Indochinese Communist Party thus surfacing his Communist allegiance so repugnant to Vietnamese nationalists. In 1933 Nguyen Ai Quoc was reported dead and his death was accepted as genuine by Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese alike. The Communist Vietnamese were grieved, but the nationalist Vietnamese were more restrained in their mourning since the betrayer of their colleagues had passed to his next reincarnation. Some were plainly relieved that the leading menace to the nationalist movements was gone. They buried their grudges with the memory of Nguyen Ai Quoc.

ALIAS HO CHI MINH

After the false report of his death, Nguyen Ai Quoc, under a variety of other aliases worked in Thailand, Malaya, and the Soviet Union. In 1941, eight years later, Nguyen Ai Quoc emerged from a Chinese Nationalist prison and under the alias of Ho Chi Minh—"Ho who is determined to be enlightenment"—was sent into Vietnam by the U.S.S. to organize an escape net for allied pilots in Japanese occupied North Vietnam. Ho was also sponsored by a Chinese nationalist warlord who wanted to wrap up North Vietnam for himself as a V-J day present. As Ho Chi Minh, new in name and appearance (tuberculosis had aged and emaciated him, prison had grayed his hair) encountered Vietnamese nationalists, he avoided any identification with Nguyen Ai Quoc's record, downgraded the Communist Party Nguyen Ai Quoc had created and asked people to join in a Front against the Japanese. Under this name and with this organizational mask, Ho Chi Minh became the war hero and liberation hero of most Vietnamese. (Not until 1960 in public print in Hanoi did Ho Chi Minh admit that he was Nguyen Ai Quoc.)

BEHIND THE MASK—THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Consistently throughout the years from 1941 through 1945, the Communist movement hid under the mask of a Front. In 1945 with the Japanese surrender the Communist movement emerged, entered a coalition government in 1946 which was nationalists, communist and neutralist in representation. In six months, the Communists had murdered, arrested or terrorized the nationalists into flight, and the iron control of the Party had been established. However, when the war with the French began a month later, Ho once again found it necessary to abolish publicly the Communist Party and create a broad popular front which nationalist non-Communists could be expected to join.

THE LEGACY OF NGUYEN AI QUOC—1954

After France lost at Dienbienphu in 1954 and the Geneva Accords were signed in France and North Vietnam, Ho had a difficult time explaining to the Southern Communist movement of his organization why having lost the war in 1954, France was to be permitted two more years to hang on in South Vietnam. One reason was that the Soviet Union had insisted that Ho give France two more years in Indochina as an incentive for the French to vote against the European Defense community plan then being considered in the French Parliament. Thus it was for the International Communist priority of weakening the Western European defenses which denied the 250 Soviet army divisions, that Ho Chi Minh sold out the hopes of the Southern Communists.

BAD NEWS FOR THE SOUTHERN COMMUNISTS

Between 80,000 to 100,000 Southerners had been ordered to go North at the time of Geneva to train and prepare in the North for the return to South Vietnam to organize the Communist vote in the South in 1956. For these Southern Communists who were in North Vietnam, the North's land reform revolt and the Party's eroded political condition were bad news. The need was plain. The balance between Ho's problems and Diem's progress had to be corrected by a shift in tactics.

RETURN TO THE SOUTH TO ORGANIZE AND KILL

The Southern Communist re-grouppees, trained in North Vietnam went back into the South to focus the local grievances in the villages of the countryside, to organize resistance to the central Government in South Vietnam, and to kill by assassination and terror those serving the government cause in the countryside. It was this pattern, using the 5,000 hold-out stay-behind Communist troops that Ho had ordered to remain in escrow in the South, that enabled these local Southern re-grouppees to carry out their tasks. They killed the corrupt first, the efficient second and never touched the mediocre. A lot of Vietnamese started to get mediocre in the performance of their tasks simply to get to the next year. The killings started in 1957. The Communists never publicly mentioned Communism nor did they create a public Communist organization. They simply rode the tiger of local grievance, joining and supporting whatever the local organizations and memories would respond to and at the same time the network of clandestine Communist agents and membership spread carefully in a technique the Communists professionally called "bead-stringing." There was much local grievance to exploit. The scene was set for the next three years of Communist assassination, terror and organizing. Diem grew increasingly repressive in response to the deteriorating security situation.

CREATION OF THE NLF—ANOTHER "FRONT"

In December 1960 the National Liberation Front was formed since Diem was nearly overthrown by a coup the previous month and the Communists were still publicly operating entirely through the diversity and variety of local grievances. They had to have a national organization that the people could join if Diem was toppled. The National Liberation Front was a spin-off of Ho Chi Minh's long experience in masking his unpopular Communist Party's identity behind broad popular facades. But the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was also included inside the Front. This was in fact the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party and its controlling role in the Front, which was largely a propaganda facade and apparatus, became painfully evident in 1962 when the PRP announced publicly that it was a "Marxist-Leninist Party, the vanguard of a Communist Revolution." This was sad tidings for the

Front and the believers in local grievance causes. Once again the Front, well along the road to what it assumed to be victory, was effectively abolished in favor of Party control of policy and apparatus.

THE CRUCIAL YEAR 1964—SHOULD THE NORTHERN ARMY GO IN?

In 1964 most of the effective Southern manpower pool of re-grouppees that had been sent North for training in 1954 had been used up. There still had been no uprising of the masses in South Vietnam to the Communist banner, though Diem was increasingly unpopular as a result of his deteriorating administrative apparatus in the countryside and those who carried out programs in negative fashion using his name. For the North the real question was: "If Southern cadres trained in the North are now in short supply, could the regular Northern army be sent in to wrap up the war fast?" In 1964, the Lao Dong Party moved the NVN army into training camps preparing for such a shift in policy and in September and October 1964 the first regular units of the North Vietnamese Army began to move down the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and into South Vietnam. The numbers increased as the months went by. From an initial advance party of 300 in November and December 1964, the Northern involvement rose to several thousand by the spring of 1965 and eventually to the 10 divisions (160,000 men) in the South today. It was these troops, wearing uniforms and insignia, coming in regular unit formations, that constituted the beginning of an actual invasion of the South by the North. The pattern of the war had changed.

THE U.S. RESPONSE—MISCALCULATION BY THE NORTH

The U.S. was now to be tested. Did it mean what it had always said? Would the South Vietnamese be overrun? The North could well reflect in 1970 that they had made a major miscalculation in 1964. For the U.S. response with the combat forces arriving in March and June 1965 prevented the collapse of South Vietnam and remains today the major element blocking a North Vietnamese military victory on the battlefield. Moreover, in 1969 President Nixon's Vietnamization policy for the first time turned priority attention to the training and equipping of the South Vietnamese in a role of leadership which places the burden for the defense of the South on the shoulders of the Southerners. The on-going U.S. troop reduction is timetable to enable the South to prepare to meet this challenge. Such a shift can only represent anathema to the North. For Southerners have never in 2,500 years of Vietnamese history been ruled by Northerners and a trained and equipped Southerner in his own back yard is the strongest psychological barrier to a North Vietnamese regular army intruder into the South. That is why the North has attempted to preserve the fiction for so long that it really has no troops in the South and at the same time has insisted that the U.S. must withdraw unilaterally and precipitately get out so that there will be a guaranteed Southern collapse of the non-Communist nationalists. That is the only way North Vietnam (with the mask of the NLF shredded and torn by the Tet offensive of 1968 which resulted in the execution by the Southern Communists of 5,700 people in the city of Hue in 26 days of occupation) can hope for a military success in South Vietnam. They had never thought the U.S. would in fact come to the aid of South Vietnam with troops when for seven years South Vietnam was being cut to pieces and the U.S. had sent only a few advisors. Now the North is equally worried about how to get the Americans out fast. President Nixon has indicated that one of the ways

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that the war can be most speedily resolved is by meaningful negotiations at Paris or elsewhere. If the Hanoi leadership refuses to negotiate then the Vietnamization program will be a constant reminder that as they daily, the South Vietnamese who have a deep residual abiding rivalry with the North are being given more time and tools to get ready.

NEW POLITICAL GROWTH AT THE RICE ROOTS IN THE SOUTH—1967-1970

It is in this context that the series of elections from the village to the Presidency in South Vietnam should be viewed. Village self-government is back. The present Saigon leadership reincarnated this venerable Vietnamese tradition in 1967. It also fostered a budget and leadership role for the village councils that more appropriately equate with the 20th century needs for services and development. Village elections were held in 1,000 villages in 1967. Another 1,000 villages were able to conduct elections as a result of the inability of the Communist forces to keep government contact away from the villages following the 1968 Tet offensive which cost the Communist more than 230,000 dead and opened up, as a result, communications and access to nearly 1,000 more villages in the following six months. Thus 2,000 of the total 2,300 villages in South Vietnam today have ignored Viet Cong threats, have voted for their own local leadership and are busy trying to rebuild their own local society despite the decade of war. The national elections, which also have ignored the VC have resulted in a House and Senate, a Presidency and Vice Presidency being created and candidates elected. In the summer of 1970, 1,000 villages held re-elections for their councils. With five candidates trying for each seat available, the 44 province councils (they advise the 44 province chiefs or governors) were elected, and in August 1970 30 seats of the 60 seat South Vietnamese Senate were the subject of re-election. Sixteen, ten-man slates vied for the three ten-man slate positions contested, and the winning slate was the Buddhist, with Opposition Independents second and a pro-Thieu slate third. Even the losers said this was the most honest election in their experience.

THE BIG QUESTION FOR HANOI

In 1971, the whole country of South Vietnam votes again for the Presidency, the Vice Presidency, the Lower House of the National Assembly and the village councils in 1,000 villages. The big question for the Southern Communists is what role they will play in these elections. The U.S. and South Vietnam have offered them a chance to negotiate, to cease firing and come in and compete politically, joining in determining the arrangements for the rules and the supervision of the balloting. Hanoi and the VC have rejected these proposals and instead repeat the tired refrain that the U.S. should simply unilaterally get out and that prior to any elections a coalition government of "progressive" forces must be imposed upon the people of South Vietnam as we go. Yet non-Communist nationalist South Vietnam remembers the brief coalition experiences with North Vietnam's Communists in 1946 when the nationalists were terrorized and decimated within six months. And South Vietnam remembers the preview of Communist rule in the city of Hue where in 1968 5,700 people were executed by local Communist forces during 26 days of occupation. The U.S. is willing to talk about any settlement that preserves for the South the right to choose its own path free from outside attack, there will be no surrender. North Vietnam didn't make it through a military invasion of the South and she will not be allowed to pick up the victory politically by a U.S. cut and run. The South Vietnamese will have their increased capabilities, their test and their choice.

THE NORTH AFTER HU

In the North, Ho Chi Minh died in 1969. His heirs debate the correctness or the blunder of the policies of 1964, the sending of Northern troops and the resulting cost of the war at home. Hanoi has lost its major industrial development throughout the country. More than 700,000 Northern regular army soldiers have been killed in the South. Since 1968, the Northern wounded are coming home bearing witness by their condition of blindness, loss of limbs or crippled condition to the fury of the battle. Since 1969, death benefit payments have been instituted to the families of Northern soldiers killed in the South further surfacing the public knowledge about the terrible human cost of Northern invasion of South Vietnam.

During the time of the bombing of North Vietnam by the U.S., the war was described as being a resistance against American air raids aimed at softening up the North for invasion. The fact that Northern draftees had been sent to South Vietnam was not publicized. Northern sons were defending the coast against such an invasion. Today with the bombing ended, Northern families ask why their sons have not returned since the post-bombing condition of North Vietnam is described by Northern writers and dramatists as "a time of peace." In some plays and short stories in North Vietnam, there is often a subtle protest role surfaced. The "mother" saying: "Why should I send my son South, so many have gone, so few have returned." In the same pattern, there are hippies in Hanoi, sons of the elite, or drop-outs from the revolution whose dress and life style infuriate the party. In 1971, a rock and roll band was sentenced to 15 years for playing "golden music" in psychedelic cellars in Hanoi luring the youth from the path of revolutionary endeavor. Above all, there is the debate within the Party about the priorities of the war in the South and the need to build and reconstruct in the North. There are constant warnings in the Hanoi Party press to fight the increased corruption and decay that is appearing in the society. The events of 1970-71 concerning Cambodia and Laos offer little comfort to the Lao Dong Party and the 21 million people of North Vietnam under its rule. The war and its costs are very real. Yet for Hanoi there is still no victory in sight.

THREE-DIMENSIONAL FOCUS—NEGOTIATION AND VIETNAMIZATION

These are some of the factors which make it necessary for those who seek to understand this problem to place the Vietnamese in three-dimensional focus. This is unlike any war or situation we have ever encountered and that is why President Nixon has decided to follow a policy that on the one hand offers peace through negotiation and on the other continues to turn responsibilities over to the South through Vietnamization.

SETTING A DATE IN VIETNAM—THE IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS

Setting a date for a unilateral, final and total withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam will undercut the Allied effort to negotiate a just peace and will end any incentive whatsoever for Hanoi's leaders to negotiate seriously. It will deliver the victory the Communists have no hope of achieving on the battlefield and which they have never dared to seek via a test of verifiably free political competition.

ALLIED PEACE PROPOSALS

President Nixon, supported by South Vietnam's President Thieu, on October 7, 1970 proposed a five point program for a just peace calling for:

An internationally supervised cease-fire in place throughout Indochina;

The establishment of an Indochina Peace Conference;

Negotiation of an agreed timetable for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam on the basis of North Vietnamese reciprocity and international verification;

A fair political settlement reflecting the will of the South Vietnamese people and of all the political forces in South Vietnam;

The immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war by all sides

The United States has also supported South Vietnam's proposals of July 11, 1969 calling for free elections in which all people and parties of South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front (NLF) can participate and for a mixed electoral commission on which all parties including the NLF can be represented to work out the modalities and verification procedures for such elections.

ALLIED PEACE STEPS

In addition, the United States has undertaken major steps toward peace. Each of these steps was urged by the Communist side and its American supporters as constructive contributions designed not only to reduce U.S. involvement but also to open the door to negotiations. These steps include:

The 1968 halt to the bombing of North Vietnam.

Agreement on the participation of the NLF in the Paris talks;

U.S. agreement to the principle of troop withdrawals;

U.S. troop withdrawals totaling 265,000 by May 1, 1971, to reach a total of 365,500 U.S. troops withdrawn by December 1, 1971. The authorized ceiling for U.S. military personnel in Vietnam will have dropped from 549,500 in January 1969 when President Nixon took office, to 184,000 by December 1971. Further reductions are expected under the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization program;

A series of de-escalatory steps substantially cutting back B-52 activity and U.S. tactical air activity in Southeast Asia;

Appointment of a new senior negotiator in Paris.

COMMUNIST INTRANSIGENCE

Hanoi and the NLF have rejected these and all other proposals and steps for peace:

They refuse even to consider the Allied proposals as agenda items at the Paris talks.

They have continued to reject all notions of reciprocity, verifiably open elections or international verification.

Despite their promises, they refuse to negotiate with the Government of Vietnam.

They demand that the United States commit itself unilaterally and unconditionally:

To total unilateral withdrawal of all troops and war materiel, and the dismantling of all U.S. bases.

To the overthrow of the leaders of the Government of Vietnam (President, Vice President and Prime Minister).

To the arbitrary imposition of a so-called "coalition" government established prior to any elections and in the absence of any international verification. It would consist of the NLF's "Provisional Revolutionary Government" and various persons as defined in the NLF's views as "really standing for peace, independence, and neutrality."

In exchange for such a total unilateral commitment by the U.S., Hanoi and the NLF have pledged absolutely nothing. They have at best indicated that if all has been done they might "discuss"—i.e. no release—the prisoners of war.

While Hanoi continues to deny that there is a single North Vietnamese soldier outside of North Vietnam, 100,000 North Vietnamese soldiers are in South Vietnam, 50,000 are in Laos and 50,000 are in Cambodia continuing to wage wars of aggression against North Vietnam's neighbors.

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In assessing the unwillingness of the Vietnamese Communists to accept the principles of reciprocity, cease-fire, open political competition, international verification, etc. one must look at their record.

First, the Politburo of Hanoi's Lao Dong (Communist) Party has massively violated all the international agreements it has signed concerning South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia while it denies that it has a single soldier outside of its borders.

Second, Hanoi's self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist "peoples' dictatorship" has never dared risk the revealing political litmus test of tolerating the slightest diversity, political competition or international inspections in areas under its control. In contrast with South Vietnam's diverse political parties, highly competitive electoral system and lively parliament and press, Hanoi runs a Stalinist state on the basis of a single slate of candidates, a dormant parliament and total police control. The Hanoi regime is built on the liquidation of all earlier non-Communist "coalition" and "Front" partners and on total monopoly in all political, economic, cultural and military affairs.

Third, the southern branch of Hanoi's Lao Dong Party, the Peoples' Revolutionary Party of the National Liberation Front, is a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist party. It is committed, as it demonstrated via systematic political assassinations in the city of Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive, to imposing a rigid Communist "peoples' dictatorship" upon the South Vietnamese.

Fourth, far from involving simply a small independent group of nationalists fighting a "civil war" in South Vietnam, tens of thousands of Communist Hanoi's regular army troops have for years carried on assassination and warfare against North Vietnam's neighbors across North Vietnam's internationally recognized borders.

Fifth, along with their masters in Hanoi, these North Vietnamese forces are dependent on the doctrines, the diplomatic support and for 100% of their arms on the two Communist super-powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Those who urged Allied submission to the demands of the Vietnamese Communists would do well to consider whether the hypocrisies involved in those demands should not be rejected in favor of a rational, reciprocal approach.

If the Hanoi leadership can obtain a unilateral U.S. withdrawal date without undertaking its own withdrawals and accepting the principles of international verification, open elections, prisoner releases, etc., it will have no incentive whatsoever to negotiate seriously and will be encouraged to continue its war policies.

To undercut the chance for a just settlement and to accept the enemy's unilateral demands, would be to betray President Nixon's solemn pledge of May 14, 1969 that the United States, understanding the stakes and sacrifices involved, has "ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised defeat."

PROGRESS IN VIETNAM

The war in South Vietnam has wound down to a point well below the levels of previous years as a result of progress in Vietnamization and reduced enemy strength and capability. As a result, the US involvement in the conflict has dropped sharply. The momentum of the pacification program was preserved during 1970, the economy of SVN is beginning to show signs that stability will return, and the political climate is viable. No discernible progress has been made in Paris, despite President Nixon's five-point peace proposal, which provides a fair and equitable basis for a negotiated peace.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR SHARPLY REDUCED

Redeployments: During 1970, about 135,000 US troops redeployed. US troop strength at the close of the year was 335,000, compared to the 543,000 peak strength in April 1969. As of March 20 there were about 313,000 troops in country, a 22,000 man reduction since the beginning of the year. By May 1971, US strength in Vietnam will be below 234,000 men—the lowest level since July 1966 and about half of the peak strength two years ago.

US Combat and Non-Combat Deaths: US combat deaths in 1970 were the lowest of any years since 1965. They were 55% below 1969 levels; 71% lower than in 1968. In the last half of 1970 they were 54% below the first half rate and were lower than any six month period in the past five years. Combat deaths in December were lower than in any month since October 1965. Since the first of this year combat deaths have averaged about 44 per week (even lower than the 51 per week during July-December 1970). Non combat deaths have declined at about the same rate as US troops have redeployed—despite press allegations to the contrary.

Sortie Rates: In 1970, US planes flew 36% fewer attack sorties in SEA than in 1969. They flew 48% fewer sorties than in 1968. The consumption of air munitions showed similar declines (1970 was 25% below 1969, 27% below 1968). In South Vietnam alone, 52% fewer attack sorties were flown than in 1969 and 53% less than in 1968. So far this year, we have flown one-fourth the number of attack sorties in SVN that we flew last year. And, despite a great deal of air support to ARVN in Laos recently, the SEA-wide attack sortie rates are down about 25%.

Costs: The cost of the war to the US declined about \$5 billion during FY 70, and will drop about \$4 billion further in FY 71. We expect war costs to decline an additional \$3 billion or more during FY 72. To date, estimated savings as a result of Vietnamization since 1968 are \$10 billion.

VIETNAMIZATION/PACIFICATION GOING WELL

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF): Strength increased 7% in 1970, and 15% since U.S. redeployments began in July 1969. Most of the increase occurred in the forces necessary for pacification—Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). The tempo of RVNAF operations has increased as they assume the major burden of the war: RVNAF now accounts for more than 60% of the reported enemy killed in action.

Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF): The number of aircraft has increased nearly 70% since Vietnamization began. Total VNAF sorties flown during 1970 increased 64% compared to 1969, and are holding at those levels so far this year.

Vietnamese Navy: The majority of U.S. naval assets in RVN has been turned over to the Vietnamese. The U.S. naval effort within South Vietnam is now limited to an advisory and support role. (There are, of course, U.S. Navy ships operating in waters off the coast of Vietnam.)

Pacification. During the 1½ year period of U.S. redeployments, pacification progress (as measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System—1970) continued. The HES/70 A-B-C (relatively secure) score rose 14 percentage points (to 95%); the A-B (secure) score gained over 20 points. Captured enemy documents continually confirm the success of the GVN pacification program by exhorting their cadre to attack it.

Experienced observers returning to Vietnam after long periods out of the country unanimously agree that security conditions in the countryside are better than ever before, and that the allied main force military campaign has achieved most of its objectives

in the southern half of the country, partly due to the outstanding success of the Cambodian operations.

A survey of the rural population reveals that economic problems (concern over rising prices) have superseded physical security as their greatest concern—a further confirmation of pacification progress.

ENEMY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES LIMITED

The enemy has moved away from a military type conflict, turning to guerrilla warfare in most areas. Battalion sized enemy attacks declined more than 60% during 1970; only one was reported in South Vietnam during the last half of 1970, none thus far in 1971. The enemy has been primarily using terror and harassment—targeting Territorial Forces (RF/PF), paramilitary forces and civilians, while avoiding Regular Forces—a possible sign of weakness.

There were about 103,000 enemy killed in action in 1970 compared to 157,000 in 1969, and 181,000 in 1968. The 34% decline in 1970 is further evidence of the winding down of the war.

Enemy infrastructure (VCI), the political and subversive machinery, remains a serious problem, but is estimated to have declined about 20% in strength during 1970. The Government of Vietnam is increasing the pressure on this subversive threat, mainly by improving the National Police forces.

THE ECONOMY OF SVN IMPROVED

Economic Reforms: Rampant inflation and the economic instability generated by the war have led to recent reforms in exchange rates, advance deposit requirements for financing certain imports, and increased interest rates. These economic reforms were taken to dampen inflation, increase GVN revenues, and to strike at the black market for US dollars and goods. The reforms have temporarily stabilized the Saigon retail price index, and dramatically cut black market conversion of dollars into piastres.

Serious economic problems remain, basically the result of a growing GVN budget deficit and the long range need to promote sound economic development. U.S. Embassy, MACV and USAID advisors continue to work with GVN officials in efforts to extend the recent reforms, establish a sound tax structure, foster economic development and exports, and attract private investment capital.

The Rural Economy: Despite the problems noted above, a quiet economic revolution has taken place in rural Vietnam. While urban income has declined from inflation, the peasant has been getting higher and higher prices for his rice and his real income has risen significantly.

The shift stems from four factors: (1) increased security in the countryside, (2) road networks re-opened or built, enabling the peasant to get his rice to market, (3) the transistor revolution whereby his radio tells him the latest prices of rice in the cities and thus improves his ability to bargain with the rice buyers, and (4) the new "miracle" rice.

1450 miles (2400 km) of roads have been built and opened. An additional 360 miles (600 km) are currently under construction, to be built by mid 1972. The GVN will maintain about 2000 miles (3200 km) of all weather roads in 1971.

"Miracle" rice (a fast growing, disease resistant variety) was cultivated on more than 700,000 acres in 1970. Current programs call for expanding production to 1,858,000 acres in 1971-72. This year Vietnam will produce enough rice to feed itself.

The recently enacted land-to-the-tiller program will ultimately vest ownership of about 2,250,000 acres of rice land in more than 500,000 rural families. Through 30 November 1970, 20,552 titles for 68,666 acres were issued to 17,049 farmers. Nearly one million acres of land are scheduled for distribution in 1971. The program is expected to be com-

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plete by the end of 1973 at a cost to the GVN of \$400 million (the US, subject to Congressional approval, is to provide \$40 million for the program).

THE POLITICAL SCENE NOW LIVELY

Elections of senators, provincial councils, and local officials took place in 1970. All of the elections were judged reasonably fair, even by the most critical observers. Moreover, there were indications of increased involvement and sophistication on the part of the average citizen. For example, more than 60% of the rural population now feel that the way to remove ineffective or unpopular officials is to vote them out in the next election.

In 1971, the Vietnamese are scheduled to elect the entire (187 seat) lower House and the President and Vice-President. Electioneering has already begun. Thus far, the three candidates mentioned most frequently for the presidency are President Thieu, General Minh and Vice President Ky. The An Quang Buddhists emerged as a powerful interest group in the Senate elections and are expected to be a strong factor again this year. Enemy attempts to disrupt the elections in 1970 were inconsequential. It is possible that they intend to play a larger role in 1971.

PROSPECTS

U.S. redeployments coupled with Vietnamization, will continue during 1971. The enemy is expected to continue his wait-and-see strategy, largely avoiding military action in RVN.

Despite President Nixon's five point peace proposal; a ceasefire in place, an Indochina peace conference, negotiation of a timetable for complete U.S. withdrawal as part of an overall settlement, search for a political settlement fair to all parties, the immediate and unconditional release of all POW's held by both sides, the Paris peace talks continue to be stalemated. The proposal provides the basis for meaningful negotiation; if only the other side were willing to engage in serious talks. It recognizes the desire of the Vietnamese people and the rest of the free world for an end to hostilities, recognizes that a permanent solution must encompass the whole of Indochina, and recognizes the existence and continued involvement of the other side in the political future of South Vietnam. It does not call for a surrender or even tacit admission by the other side of their deteriorating military and political situation. It assures that the interests of all parties to the conflict can be acknowledged and served.

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VIETNAM

President Nixon has taken a number of significant steps toward ending the war and winning the peace in Vietnam. The United States is fighting to deter North Vietnam's aggression, but at the same time is attempting to achieve a just and honorable peace.

Vietnam has shown steady progress in the two years since President Nixon took office in January 1969 and since the Vietnamization program got underway.

The phased reductions under the Administration's Vietnamization program reduced the authorized American troop ceiling of 549,500 and in-country strength of 542,000 men in January 1969 to 335,000 by January 1971 and to 284,000 by May 1971. On April 7, 1971 the President announced a further reduction to 184,000 by December 1971.

American combat deaths had been reduced from the levels of 14,561 or 278 weekly in 1968 to 4,183 and 80 weekly in 1970 and were averaging 40 or fewer a week in early 1971.

In 1968 the war was costing an additional \$22 billion. In early 1971 the additional costs are running at half that and are steadily decreasing.

Since security in the countryside has substantially improved, local and national governments are performing with increased effectiveness and a number of agricultural and economic programs are underway.

With carefully tailored U.S. assistance under the Vietnamization program, South Vietnam's regular and local forces have greatly increased their capabilities and have taken over the major share in effectively defending their country against North Vietnam's attack.

The limited cross border operations against North Vietnamese bases along the Cambodian border and against the Ho Chi Minh

Trail in Laos demonstrated the growing strength of the South Vietnamese forces in facing the best of the enemy's remaining forces on the enemy's terrain. Large stocks of war materiel were captured or destroyed, several tens of thousands of casualties were inflicted on North Vietnamese forces and Hanoi's offensive timetables were set back by a year. At the same time security was provided to South Vietnam's populated regions and American troop reduction plans were safeguarded.

And even in the midst of war, South Vietnam has continued its path of constitutional development. The National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the locally elected councils at hamlet, village and province level are playing increasingly important roles. Last August's Senate elections were marked by the participation and victory of the Buddhist opposition slate who called the elections fair, and political participation and progress are expected to continue as South Vietnam approaches new national elections this fall.

The U.S. has maintained a flexible negotiation posture in Paris in the event that the other side will recognize the desirability of concluding the war through serious negotiations rather than prolonged combat.

President Nixon on October 7, 1970, announced a five-point proposal for a just peace in Indochina calling for (1) an internationally supervised ceasefire in place throughout all of Indochina as part of a general move to end the war in Indochina; (2) establishment of an Indochina Peace Conference; (3) negotiation of an agreed timetable for complete reciprocal withdrawals from Vietnam; (4) a fair political settlement reflecting the will of the South Vietnamese people and the political forces in South Vietnam; and (5) the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war by all sides.

The President has also supported South Vietnam's proposals of July 11, 1969 and October 8, 1970 calling for free elections in which all the people and parties of South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front, can participate, and for a mixed Electoral Commission in which all parties can be represented.

In his February 25, 1971 report to the Congress, President Nixon recounted major steps toward peace taken by the Allies.

"Since 1968 the U.S. has done almost everything that various parties—including Hanoi—told us would kindle negotiations. We halted the bombing and other acts of force against North Vietnam. We agreed to NLF participation in the Paris talks. We agreed to the principle of withdrawal and made initial withdrawals of American troops. We made substantial withdrawals, soon to total 265,000. We agreed in principle to remove all our troops. We took a series of de-escalatory steps, such as cutting back our B-52 and tactical air sorties. And we appointed a new senior negotiator in Paris."

"These steps, except for the bombing halt, were unilateral measures, designed not only to reduce our involvement, but also to open the door to negotiations. Each of them was urged by the other side as a constructive contribution. None of them has generated movement by the other side."

It takes two to negotiate but thus far the Communist side has rejected each of the Allied proposals and continues to press its attacks. As a condition to even discussing these proposals, they insist that we accept their demands for total and unconditional U.S. withdrawal and end the Vietnamization assistance program for the prior removal of the elected leaders of the Government of South Vietnam and for the imposition of an NLF run "coalition" government prior to any elections.

Finally, any evaluation of the American role in assisting the South Vietnamese in

May 13, 1971

their struggle against North Vietnam's aggression must consider the fact that the South Vietnamese people have much to fear from the pattern of massive repression systematically practiced by North Vietnam's Communist Party. In North Vietnam this Stalinist Party operates a "peoples' dictatorship" which permits no forms of opposition or diversity. Its liquidation policies against its short lived "coalition" partners of 1945-1946 and of those who differed with Communist policy after 1954 in the North are matters of public record. It is this record and the record of the party's southern branch, the Marxist-Leninist "Peoples' Revolutionary Party of the so-called National Liberation Front (who in the city of Hue, for example, systematically assassinated thousands of their opponents) that perhaps explains South Vietnamese desire for help in resisting Hanoi's armies and its front.

In his February 25, 1971 report to the Congress, President Nixon restated the goals of American policy in Indochina.

"I will continue to do what is necessary to protect American men as they leave Vietnam. Throughout I will keep the American people and the Congress fully informed.

"A negotiated settlement for all Indochina remains our highest priority. But if the other side leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternate route to peace—phasing out our involvement while giving the region's friendly countries the time and the means to defend themselves."

VULTURES TOO FULL TO FLY

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 12, 1971

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to comment briefly on the situation in East Pakistan, or Bangla Desh as the Bengalis and their supporters prefer it to be called. On May 11, my Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing on this matter. We were scheduled to meet May 13 to hear the witnesses from the Department of State and the Agency for International Development in executive session and professor Robert Dorfman of Harvard University in open session. Unfortunately, that day of hearing must now be postponed and it will be rescheduled as soon as possible.

Whatever the politics involved in this region, I firmly believe that one of the great human tragedies of modern times may be in the process of being created. As additional background material for the continuing debate over the American role and the role of the world community in mounting a humanitarian assistance program, I would like to call my colleagues' attention to the testimony of Senator Edward M. Kennedy before my subcommittee yesterday, a position paper of the Ripon Society dated April 3, and a news dispatch from the Washington Star of May 12.

The phrase in the news dispatch about "vultures too full to fly" may be regarded as vulgar by many people unfamiliar with the history and the potential for tragedy in this region. However, it does graphically reflect the position of many who are intimately familiar with past events and with informed future predictions.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that the material referred to be inserted into the RECORD at this point, as well as my opening statement at the hearing yesterday.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER

The Subcommittee will come to order.

We are beginning hearings today looking into the situation in East Pakistan with particular emphasis on the related problems of refugees and famine.

I think it would be useful to briefly summarize events leading to what may be one of the worst human tragedy in modern times.

In November 1970 a cyclone and flood killed thousands in East Pakistan and crippled the main port of Chittagong. The recent fighting has prevented most crops from being planted. Because East Pakistan is a food deficit region in the best of times, as many as 30 million people may starve, according to reports said to have been submitted to the Agency for International Development and the World Bank. Right now, refugees are streaming from East Pakistan into India at the rate of 60,000 each day, swelling the already strained Indian food supply by an estimated 1.5 million new mouths to feed.

The refugees and the potential famine are the result of civil war which broke out on March 25, 1971. While politics of Pakistan and the Subcontinent are not the focus of this hearing, it is important to remember that in the election for a National Constitutional Assembly in December 1970, the Awami League captured 167 of the 169 seats contested in the East. This gave them an absolute majority of the 313 seats contested in all of Pakistan.

While the government of Yahya Kahn now is in apparent control of the cities, those who embrace autonomy for Bangla Desh claim the countryside. Factually, the countryside of East Pakistan is the equal of the countryside of South Vietnam in providing natural surrounding for insurgency and the fighting thus far has produced reports of savage atrocities on both sides.

Putting this together, we seem to have a situation which is potentially equal, in terms of human misery, to a combination of Vietnam and Biafra. Because of our military aid to the Central Government it appears that our arms, in conjunction with those supplied by other governments, are being used to defeat the people who won the election.

While these and other questions are as important as they seem to be unanswerable at this point, our focus is the immediate threat to the lives of millions. To emphasize that concern, we are very pleased to welcome this afternoon Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. His Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee has produced extremely valuable information about the impact of policy on people and the dimensions of the suffering and the displacement in countries where war has been conducted. The humanitarian aspect of the East Pakistan situation must be considered by all the parties involved and it will be a great pleasure to hear Senator Kennedy discuss the information developed by his Subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY ON CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here this afternoon—because, as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I share your deep concern for the victims of natural disaster and civil war in East Pakistan. I am hopeful these hearings will contribute toward a better understanding of the undeniable problems which exist in relieving this basically humanitarian problem. And I am also hopeful that the

hearings will underscore the urgent need to further encourage the initiatives underway to meet the needs of the Bengali people.

Official reports from our government and elsewhere express very serious concern about the condition of the people in East Pakistan. These reports say that within a month the condition of the people will become "acute". The precarious situation which exists today will evolve into a nightmare of death for millions—unless immediate and concerted efforts are made to meet the needs of the people involved.

Although reports from East Pakistan suggest that violence has subsided considerably, reports also indicate that feelings are tense between the people and the army of the central government. In fact official reports to our government suggest that the great bulk of the population is alienated, perhaps forever. Regretably, this can only complicate, and perhaps delay, the organizing of a meaningful relief program, and the solving of those political problems which generated the recent violence.

Moreover, reports also indicate that the army effectively controls only the cities and towns, and that throughout most of the countryside, government administration and services do not exist. The transportation and distribution of available foodstocks and medical supplies are at a standstill—even in the area struck by the cyclone last fall, where conservative estimates say a million persons have been solely dependent for their survival on effective relief operations. Food reserves—not confiscated by the army—are very low.

The tragedy, finally, has now spilled over into India, which so far has found it necessary to give asylum to nearly 2,000,000 refugees—of whom at least 526,000 are in camps. The recent daily influx into India has reportedly been some 50,000. The State Department informs me that the influx will continue at a high level, "at least until the beginning of the monsoon in a few weeks, when both military operations and travel will become more difficult". The continuing heavy influx of refugees into India is a stark reminder of how bad conditions have become in East Pakistan.

Over the last month I have repeatedly communicated my concern in these matters to officials in the Department of State and elsewhere, in an effort to encourage and support reasonable initiatives by our government and the international community to help meet the urgent political and humanitarian problems in East Pakistan. I have strongly believed these initiatives should be taken through the United Nations.

On the humanitarian problems, at least, some progress is being made.

On the Indian side of the border, and at the invitation of the Indian government, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are currently assuming relief needs and developing a plan of international action. According to a communication I received from the Department of State this morning, our government has "authorized up to \$2.5 million in food and other assistance as our initial contribution to the international relief effort." While the UNHCR effort is being organized, the U.S. is providing emergency food assistance for 217,000 refugees in West Bengal. The food assistance is being distributed by CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service/Lutheran World Federation.

Far less progress in meeting relief needs is being made in East Pakistan. Initiating an adequate relief program is undoubtedly being hampered for a number of good reasons—but, on the basis of talks I have had, the primary cause may very well be a simple lack of candor in recognizing the vast dimension of human need brought on by the conflict. Let us not quibble over how we label the situation. Whether we call it a minor disturbance, a disaster, or an emergency—the

Key U.S. Official Sent to Highlands

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, April 27—John Paul Vann, perhaps the most experienced senior American civilian in Vietnam, is being sent to head the pacification program in the troubled Central Highlands.

Informed American sources said today that Vann, who has directed the U.S. pacification effort in the Mekong Delta since February, 1969, would take over the new post in the second half of May.

Overall, the heavily populated delta countryside is considered the securest in South Vietnam, while some of the least pacified areas of the country are in the highlands.

Observers here saw the shift of Vann, who has been in South Vietnam both as a soldier and civilian for most of the past 10 years, as recognition that the situation in the highlands requires special attention.

Known administratively as Military Region Two, the highlands covers a broad band of 13 provinces across the central part of South Vietnam from the Laotian-Cambodian border to the South China Sea.

In the past month, the enemy has concentrated its offensive actions in the area, especially around Fire Support Base 6 in western Kontum Province and Phunhon district in the southern part of Pleiku Province.

U.S. advisors in Phunhon estimate that Vietcong and North Vietnamese activity, which included a siege of the district headquarters on March 15 and occupation of at least nine villages, has set back pacification there at least a year.

Vann, 46, will be replacing Edward T. Long, 48, a career foreign service officer who came to Military Region Two last June from a job as State

Department desk officer for Caribbean affairs. Long, sources said, will be reassigned outside South Vietnam.

As he has in the delta (and before that in the Saigon region) Vann will oversee the highlands branch of the organization called Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), the regional and provincial teams of American militarymen and civilians who advise the Vietnamese on everything from land reform to police training.

The job is known by the acronym "depcords" and is filled by civilians, while the regional commander is always a military man. Vann is the only one of the four present depcords who had any experience in Vietnam prior to taking the job.

The pacification chief in the northern sector of South Vietnam was the director of AID in Panama and his counterpart in the Saigon region was ambassador to Gabon.

Vann, a blunt-spoken energetic Virginian, is one of the few American officials here whose reputation has been enhanced by his work in South Vietnam over the years. As a lieutenant colonel in the early 1960s, he fell out of favor with the U.S. military establishment because of his critical assessment of the way things were going.

He returned in 1965 as a civilian to work for CORDS and lately has become known as a prime exponent of "the new optimism"—the notion that the war has been turned around, for a variety of military and economic reasons, in favor of the Saigon government.

Vann is often mentioned as a possible successor to Ambassador William E. Colby as head of CORDS countrywide.

***Soviets Seen Sending
SA-3s to Hanoi***

LONDON, April 26 (UPI)—The Soviet Union is sending SA-3 surface-to-air missiles and Soviet "advisers" to North Vietnam to reinforce its defenses against possible new U.S. air attacks, SEATO sources said today.

The sources said the advisers are to help install the missiles and train Vietnamese crews to operate the sophisticated rockets. Egypt is the only other country known to have been provided with SA-3.

PACIFICATION PUSH BEGUN IN VIETNAM

New Program, Most Costly
Yet, Aimed at Vietcong's
Political Apparatus

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 6—The most ambitious and costly pacification program yet planned for South Vietnam has been put into effect by Saigon and Washington.

Reportedly costing the United States considerably more than \$1-billion and Saigon an undisclosed sum, the 1971 "Community Defense and Local Development Plan" would greatly expand pacification activities, which are aimed at destroying Communist subversive forces and widening self-government and development.

The 304-page plan, a copy of which was made available to The New York Times, lists as the "top priority" for the year the "neutralization" of the entrenched Vietcong political apparatus.

Authenticity Confirmed

The authenticity of the document was confirmed by Administration sources who declined to discuss the contents because of the plan's confidential character.

Already in operation since March 1, and endorsed by the American command in Saigon, the new plan is reportedly the subject of wide controversy among United States officials, some of whom term it unrealistic and artificial.

Administration officials were unable to provide cost figures to the United States for previous pacification programs, but they said that the current plan, financed almost entirely in its military, security and civilian aspects by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, was much more costly because of its increased scope.

Acknowledging for the first time that the activities of the Vietcong apparatus remain a major problem in 8 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, including four in the allegedly pacified Mekong River Delta, and that South Vietnamese forces often prefer to "accommodate, rather than resist, the enemy," the plan provides for:

Expansion of the People's Self-Defense Force—the civilian antiguerrilla combat organization in rural areas—from 500,000 to four million. Women would be enlisted in combat units and children of both sexes over the age of 7 in supporting units.

Establishment of an elaborate "people's intelligence network" to inform on enemy activities.

Elimination in the year starting last month, through killing or capture, of 14,400 Vietcong agents under expansion of the three-year-old Operation Phoenix, an intelligence-gathering program that is supported by the United States military.

Wider Social Benefits

The new pacification plan, which went into effect March 1, also seeks to complete the program of holding elections in all villages and hamlets; spur land reform by setting a goal of distributing nearly a million acres of land to farmers, and widen social benefits. This would be done by providing new assistance to 216,000 war veterans, and increasing aid to 43,002 disabled soldiers, 33,743 parents of dead servicemen, 71,005 war widows and 284,000 war orphans. In addition, the plan hopes to resettle 430,000 war refugees in new homes.

Other innovations in the 1971 pacification plan include programs for ethnic minorities and for cities where crime is increasing.

Endorsed by Abrams

Elaborated upon by the South Vietnamese Government, approved by President Nguyen Van Thieu and his Cabinet and fully endorsed by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the United States commander in Vietnam, the plan is designed to dovetail with the Nixon Administration's policy of Vietnamization, under which combat responsibilities are being gradually assumed by the South Vietnamese forces.

While the Administration here and the Saigon Government report success for pacification programs that began in 1969, some American ex-

perts question their effectiveness so far and are skeptical about the soundness of the new plan.

Their main criticism is that the whole pacification effort depends too much on the 8,000 United States officials and advisers in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support programs, an agency known as CORDS.

The agency, which supervises projects from Operation Phoenix to rural economic programs, is chiefly made up of Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency employees, although it includes officials of the State Department, the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

Reports from the field indicate that CORDS officials are

frequently not aware of the true state of affairs in districts and villages and that their colleagues in civilian government and the police fail to carry out their tasks.

Critics of the pacification program point to this statement in the 1971 plan:

"In some areas, the people are reluctant to associate with the Government of Vietnam for fear of retaliation by the enemy. Civil officials often become the target of enemy terrorism and assassination and thus are reluctant to perform their government tasks.

"Some police hesitate to conduct operations against the V.C. because they fear retaliation, and local security forces, under the threat of terrorism, often accommodate, rather than resist, the enemy."

The critics raise the question of what will happen if CORDS is phased out and ask whether, as an alternative, the agency may not have to be maintained in South Vietnam indefinitely.

Three Major Objectives

As expressed in the 1971 plan, the over-all concept of pacification consists of the three objectives of "local self-defense, local self government and local self-development."

The philosophy of the program is stated as follows in the plan:

"In his efforts to achieve political control of the Republic of Vietnam, the enemy attempts to demonstrate that the Government of Vietnam is not capable of governing the country or of providing credible security to the people. His offensive operations and the resultant reaction operations by friendly forces produce adverse

effects on a security of the people. The most effective way of assuring security of the Vietnamese people is to keep enemy forces away from them and by neutralizing the Vietcong infrastructure. Without the V.C.I., enemy main forces cannot obtain intelligence, manpower and food, nor will they be able to prepare the battlefield or move."

The plan emphasizes that the "strategic concept of national security" is not dependent on the presence of American forces and paves the way for the transfer of the responsi-

bility for security from military agencies to civilian ones."

To assist this proposed transfer and supervise the new police functions the South Vietnamese and United States Governments have turned to Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert.

Sir Robert, who carried out two confidential missions for President Nixon in Vietnam in 1969 and 1970, has been in Saigon since February. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, Sir Robert said that Saigon's ability to counter subversion "has steadily improved all the time."

The pacification plan emphasized that among the 1971 targets is the reduction of "enemy terrorist incidents" to 6,010. The document did not report how many such incidents occurred in 1970, but said that the current target was to reduce them by 75 per cent in "secure areas" and by 50 per cent in areas "still undergoing pacification."

Statistics included in the plan showed that the military region that includes 15 provinces south of Saigon and in the Mekong Delta poses the most serious security problems.

The delta has been declared by the Saigon Government to be virtually pacified, except for U Minh Forest area, and all American troops left the area in 1969. But the plan reports serious problems with an entrenched Vietcong apparatus in the provinces of Vinhlong, Dinh Tuong, Bien Hoa and An Xuyen. Similar problems are reported in Binh Dinh province in the central part of the country and in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces in the northern part, adjoining the demilitarized zone.



Text of Mansfield's Pullout Amendment

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 22 — Following is the text of the Mansfield amendment adopted today by the Senate calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina within nine months subject to release of all prisoners of war.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces not later than nine months after the date of enactment of this section subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of

North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government. The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above expressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:

1. Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, such date to be not later than nine months after the date of enactment of this act.

2. Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire

by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.

3. Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established by the President pursuant to Paragraph 1 hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties.

MANSFIELD

AMENDMENT

WASHINGTON, June 22 — The Senate adopted today an amendment calling for the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina within nine months if American prisoners of war are released.

Over Administration opposition, the Senate by a vote of 57 to 42 accepted the troop-withdrawal amendment to the Selective Service Bill that was offered by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate Majority Leader.

The Mansfield Amendment must still be passed upon by the House once the Senate completes action on the bill extending Selective Service for two more years. Whether the amendment would be accepted by the more hawkish House was questionable.

Opposition Is Certain

In a House-Senate conference, the amendment was certain to be opposed by conferees from the House Armed Services Committee. But a shift of some Southern conservatives in the Senate to support the Mansfield Amendment raised the possibility that in a floor fight a similar shift might occur in the House.

The White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that the amendment was not binding and that President Nixon would continue his present policy. Mr. Ziegler added, "It states what 57 Senators think our policy should be. It is not the view of the Congress as a whole."

Adoption of the Mansfield Amendment represented the first major victory of critics of the Vietnam War in months of attempting to find some legislative formula to end the war.

The amendment would establish the policy that the United States should "terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations" in Indochina and undertake "prompt and orderly withdrawal" of all American forces within nine months after enactment of the amendment. The withdrawal would be made conditional upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam.

In line with this policy, the amendment calls upon the President to establish a final date for troop withdrawal, to negotiate an immediate ceasefire with North Vietnam to be followed by "phased and rapid" withdrawal of American forces in return for phased release of American prisoners of war.

No Fund Cut-off Date

Unlike other troop-withdrawal amendments that have been rejected by the Senate, the Mansfield Amendment would not cut off the funds to require a withdrawal by a certain date. In a Senate reluctant to use the Congressional power over appropriations to impose a withdrawal schedule on the President, this feature of the Mansfield Amendment was influential in persuading 11 Senators, largely from the South, who last week had opposed the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which would have required withdrawal by the end of the year.

The Mansfield Amendment,

however, is more binding upon the President than a sense-of-the-Senate resolution in that it establishes a policy of withdrawal within nine months, subject only to release of the prisoners.

As interpreted by Mr. Mansfield, the amendment would fill the policy void created, by the repeal last year of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution, which gave approval to all necessary steps taken by the President to repel Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Since the repeal of the Tonkin resolution, President Nixon has been relying upon his inherent powers as Commander in Chief to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of American troops as they are withdrawn from Vietnam. Should the Mansfield Amendment be adopted by the House and then the legislation signed into law by the President, Mr. Nixon, it is argued by Senator Mansfield, would then in effect have accepted the policy of withdrawal laid down by Congress and his authority would be limited to withdrawing the troops, subject only to the release of the prisoners of war.

At least in principle, the pace of withdrawal could no longer be linked to the ability of the Saigon Government to survive

—one of the factors in the Administration's present withdrawal schedule, along with the release of prisoners. The amendment would also establish a definite deadline for withdrawal, something the Administration has opposed on the ground that such a step would undercut the peace negotiations with North Vietnam.

In a statement issued immediately after the vote, Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, said that the adoption of the Mansfield Amendment was "a clear statement in favor of the basic McGovern-Hatfield amendment — establishment of a date certain for the withdrawal of all American ground and air forces from Indochina conditional only upon release of all U.S. prisoners of war."

The Senate action, he said, was "a clear repudiation of the Administration's so-called 'Vietnamization' formula" for withdrawing. "It serves notice on the President," he said, "that if he continues to pursue that course, he will do so in defiance of a strong majority in the Senate."

Senator Mark Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, hailed adoption of the Mansfield Amendment as "an historic action after years of opposition to our involvement in Vietnam."

Senator Hatfield said that while much remained to be done, a first step has been taken "that assures us that our policy can be changed by the will of the people."

By a 55-to-42 vote, the Senate last week defeated the amendment cosponsored by Senator McGovern and Senator Hatfield that would have cut off funds for deployment of troops in Indochina by the end of this year.

But today, several Senators who normally support the Administration's Vietnam policy switched to support the Mansfield amendment. These included Lloyd M. Bentsen of Texas, Robert F. Byrd of West Virginia,

David H. Gambrell of Georgia, Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, Len B. Jordan of Idaho, John L. McClellan of Arkansas, William B. Spong Jr. of Virginia, and Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia.

The Mansfield amendment was adopted after Administration forces, though considerable parliamentary maneuvering, succeeded in narrowly defeating an amendment that would have required withdrawal of all troops within nine months, with the provision that the withdrawal deadline would be superseded if North Vietnam within 60 days did not give a "firm commitment" to release

all American prisoners of war.

The amendment was cosponsored by Senators Marlow W. Cook of Kentucky and Ted Stevens of Alaska, both of whom are Republicans. In an attempt to block the Cook-Stevens amendment, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, proposed that the provision of a "firm commitment" by North Vietnam be replaced by "release" of the prisoners. Senator Cook protested that the effect of the Stennis amendment was to "gut" his amendment by setting up an impossible condition.

The Stennis amendment was first rejected by a 51-to-48 vote. But then in a series of three close votes, the Senate reconsidered and finally adopted the Stennis amendment by a 50-to-49 vote.

In the votes, Senator B. Everett Jordan, Democrat of North Carolina, switched his position to assure adoption of the Stennis amendment. Afterward, Senator Jordan, who last week voted for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, explained that he had misunderstood the import of the Stennis amendment on the first vote. He insisted that Senator Stennis had not talked to him between the votes.

VOTE MANSFIELD AMEND

FOR THE AMENDMENT—57

Democrats—45

Anderson (N.M.)	MacLusken (Wash.)
Bayh (Ind.)	Mansfield (Mont.)
Bentsen (Tex.)	McClintock (Ark.)
Bible (Nev.)	McGovern (S.D.)
Burdick (N.D.)	McIntyre (N.H.)
Ryrd (W. Va.)	Metcalfe (Mont.)
Cannon (Nev.)	Mondale (Minn.)
Chiles (Fla.)	Montoya (N.M.)
Church (Idaho)	Moss (Utah)
Cranston (Calif.)	Muskie (Maine)
Easton (Mo.)	Nelson (Wis.)
Fulbright (Ark.)	Pastore (R.I.)
Gambrell (Ga.)	Pell (R.I.)
Gravel (Alaska)	Proxmire (Wis.)
Harris (Okla.)	Randolph (W. Va.)
Hart (Mich.)	Ribicoff (Conn.)
Hartke (Ind.)	Spong (Va.)
Hollings (S.C.)	Stevenson (Ill.)
Hushe (Iowa)	Swington (Mo.)
Humphrey (Minn.)	Tammidge (Ga.)
Inouye (Hawaii)	Tunney (Calif.)
Jordan (N.C.)	Williams (N.J.)
Kennedy (Mas.)	

Republicans—12

Alken (Vt.)	Mathias (Md.)
Brooke (Mass.)	Pearson (Kan.)
Case (N.J.)	Percy (Ill.)
Hatfield (Ore.)	Schweiker (Pa.)
Javits (N.Y.)	Stevens (Alaska)
Jordan (Idaho)	Young (N.D.)

AGAINST THE AMENDMENT—42

Democrats—10

Allen (Ala.)	Jackson (Wash.)
Ryrd (Va.)	Long (La.)
Lastland (Miss.)	McGee (Wyo.)
Ellender (La.)	Sparkman (Ala.)
Ervin (N.C.)	Stennis (Miss.)

Republicans—32

Allott (Colo.)	Goldwater (Ariz.)
Baker (Tenn.)	Griffin (Mich.)
Beall (Md.)	Gurney (Fla.)
Bellmon (Okla.)	Hansen (Wyo.)
Bennett (Utah)	Hruska (Ill.)
Boggs (Del.)	Miller (Iowa)
Brock (Tenn.)	Packwood (Ore.)
Buckley (N.Y.)	Proby (Vt.)
Cook (Ky.)	Smith (Del.)
Cooper (Ky.)	Saxbe (Ohio)
Cotton (N.H.)	Scott (Pa.)
Curtis (Nebr.)	Smith (Maine)
Dole (Kan.)	Taft (Ohio)
Domelaick (Colo.)	Thurmond (S.C.)
Fannin (Ariz.)	Tower (Tex.)
Fong (Hawaii)	Wicker (Conn.)

Absent: Mundt (S.D.)

HOUSE REJECTS VIETNAM PULLOUT VOTED BY SENATE

Amendment for Withdrawal
Based on P.O.W. Release
Is Defeated, 219-176

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 —

The House refused today to accept a Senate amendment calling for withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in nine months if American prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam.

By a 219-to-176 vote, the House defeated a motion calling for acceptance of the Senate troop withdrawal amendment to the Selective Service bill. The amendment, sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, was adopted by the Senate last week by a 57-to-42 vote.

For the critics in the House of the Vietnam war, the vote was their best showing in nearly two years of trying to press the issue. They gathered 20 more votes than on a similar but more binding troop withdrawal amendment that was rejected by the House two weeks ago. They contended that if it had not been for absentees their total would have been around 190, just 14 short of a majority.

White House Victory

But the vote was still a clear victory for the White House, which worked actively to defeat the Mansfield amendment in the House. President Nixon, for example, called Speaker Carl Albert this morning, asking him to intervene in the debate against the amendment.

Mr. Albert then split with the Democratic leadership in the Senate as well as with the Democratic whip in the House, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts,

by taking to the floor to argue that the establishment of a withdrawal deadline would "interfere" with the Paris peace negotiations and "could jeopardize American lives."

Mr. Albert found himself voting with a minority of Democrats. A total of 143 Democrats and 33 Republicans voted for what was, in effect, the Mansfield amendment while 83 Democrats and 136 Republicans voted against it.

To Conference Next

The issue now goes to a Senate-House conference committee to reconcile differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill both of which extend the draft authority for two more years.

House managers of the bill, such as Representative F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, hinted at the possibility of a compromise on the language of the Mansfield amendment. But if the amendment is weakened significantly in conference, the bill faces a probable filibuster when it returns to the Senate floor.

As a result, there was a

Continued on Page 37, Column 4

growing likelihood that Congress would not extend the Selective Service law before the present draft authority expires at midnight Wednesday. Draft calls have been set for July and August, but Selective Service officials have said they did not plan to induct anyone until the draft authority was renewed. Under existing law, the system could still draft college students and others who have been deferred.

Conferees Hampered

Ordinarily, the conferees, drawn from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, could be expected to oppose the Mansfield amendment. But both sides now find themselves circumscribed by the votes in the House and Senate.

The Senate conferees cannot yield too quickly on an amendment adopted by a decisive margin in the Senate. And the House conferees can point to today's vote as a reason why they should not yield. Critics of the war are holding the threat of a Senate filibuster over both sides if the conferees fail to reach an acceptable compromise.

As in the past, the House leadership resorted today to procedural moves to prevent a direct up-and-down vote on the Vietnam issue.

A motion instructing the House conferees to accept the Mansfield amendment was offered by Representative Charles W. Whalen Jr., Republican of Ohio. Rather than permit a direct vote on the Whalen motion, Mr. Hébert moved to table, or lay aside, the motion. It was the Hébert tabling motion that was adopted by the 219-to-176 vote.

Against Instructing

Throughout the debate, Mr. Hébert and the Republican leadership posed the issue not so much as whether the Mansfield amendment should be accepted but rather whether the House should instruct and thus, as they put it, "tie the hands" of the House conferees. With this argument they were appealing to the traditional reluctance of the House to instruct conferees to accept a Senate amendment.

"In the interests of this country," Mr. Hébert pleaded with the House, "don't shackle me. Please don't put the handcuffs on my conferees."

In a similar vein, Representative Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, the House Republican leader, asserted that the conferees should be given a "free

hand" to see whether they could work out some "reasonable" substitute to the Mansfield amendment.

The amendment would establish as "policy" the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina in nine months, subject only to the release of all American prisoners of war. It also calls upon the President to negotiate a cease-fire with North Vietnam, to be followed by the phased withdrawal of American troops and return for the phased release of the prisoners of war.

Leading the argument for the amendment, Mr. O'Neill said:

it would give the House a chance to "reaffirm Congressional responsibility in the formation of American policy."

"Just as we were irresponsible in letting the war start," he told the House, "let us be responsible in ending it."

C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S.

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Vietcong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Mr. Nixon and other top Administration officials last Friday a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Vietcong delegate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks.

The agency's evaluation, according to senior Administration officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the United States delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

Reservations Expressed

The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Vietcong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan. The C.I.A. paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the Administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made today in Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection.

They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

At San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon and Mr. Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d,

Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on Sunday. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday.

Mr. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Mr. Bruce in Paris on Saturday.

Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, whose agency was reported to have drafted the first analysis of the Vietcong plan, participated in the discussions on the United States response to the Communist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with President Nixon and Mr. Rogers last Tuesday.

Officials familiar with various Administration evaluations of the Vietcong plan said that the C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic—but also the most realistic—of the lot."

Its over-all conclusion, contained in the first paragraph of the document, said:

"The Vietcong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on United States disengagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

New Nuances Recognized

The analysis recognized, however, that "there are two new nuances in the Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietnam."

The principal features of Mrs. Binh's plan were the Communist readiness to start releasing United States war prisoners as American troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Washington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing insistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement.

But after analyzing the plan, the C. I. A. offered this assessment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 proposals:

"The Communists doubtless hope that their initiative on the prisoners—coupled as it is with a restatement of their basic position on United States withdrawals—will make things awkward for the United States Government both at home and overseas."

"They may also believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the United States who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war.

upon whom Hanoi and the Vietcong had looked with favor in the past.

The analysis said that the Vietcong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease backing the bellicose group' headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu administration."

"The Communists seem to be trying to leave the impression that the form of government is open to negotiation," the document said. "Moreover, the language of this section—and indeed much of the statement—is cast to convey an image of

conciliation and reasonableness without committing Hanoi to anything specific."

The analysts also warned against pitfalls in the Communist proposal for releasing the American prisoners in exchange for the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam under a set deadline. This has appeared to be the most attractive aspect of Mrs. Binh's peace package.

But the analysts said that while "the formulation on the prisoner-release question is new," the Communist demand on total United States military disengagement "is as firm as ever."

"Moreover, by including for the first time civilian as well as military prisoners, the Communists are opening the whole thorny problem of the Communist civilian cadre who are now held by Saigon," it said.

said here about the Bruce proposal that "we regret that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong did not respond affirmatively to this suggestion but continue to hope that they will do so."

Nixon Expected to Wait

Highly-placed officials indicated their belief that President Nixon would refrain from publicly expressing his views on the developments in the talks until the situation became "much clearer" through public or private exchanges in Paris.

They said that only after such clarifications would Mr. Nixon address the nation on the state of the negotiations. They recalled that last year he had waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counterproposal on Oct. 7.

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again when Henry A.

They probably are also hoping that the new proposal will fuel worries in Saigon about Washington's longer-term support.

"The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, anti-war constituency."

Coincidence of Beliefs

This aspect of the analysis was known to coincide with the belief in other Administration quarters that the Communist peace plan was launched, at least in part, to influence the outcome of the October elections in South Vietnam, where President Nguyen Van Thieu is seeking re-election.

In this context, the analysis noted that "among other things" the Communists seem intent on creating the impression that the election of Big Minh could prove an initial step toward peace."

"Big Minh" is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a potential but undeclared presidential candidate